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ABSTRACT 
 
Do Firms’ Earnings Reported Under IFRS 3R Reveal More About Future Earnings 
and Cash Flows? 
Evidence from The European Union 
by 
WANG Lin Yuan 
Master of Philosophy 
 
Motivated by recent studies documenting inconsistent results regarding the benefits 
of adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the objective of this 
thesis is to examine the information value of firms’ earning reported focusing on 
IFRS 3 (Business Combination). IFRS 3 aims at providing systematic guidelines for 
acquirers of a business combination transaction to properly report identifiable assets 
and liabilities, to fairly measure goodwill and to disclose relevant information for 
investors’ evaluation. IFRS 3 was revised and became effective in July 2009. 
Opponents of the revised IFRS 3 (IFRS 3R) criticized the guidelines to have 
broadened the disconnection between current earnings and future cash flows and 
they argued against the widened implementation of fair value measurement by IFRS 
3.  This thesis covers European Union’s mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 along 
with the revision of IFRS 3 in 2009. The examination period is split into two time 
periods: Period 1 is from the mandatory adoption of IFRS to the eve of policy 
change, and Period 2 is from the policy change to the end of 2013.  Sample in this 
study comprises of 374 firms involved in merger and acquisition (M&A) 
transactions in both time periods which results in 13,464 firm-quarterly observations 
drawn from 20 out of 28 European Union member countries.  
This study finds the association between current earnings and future earnings as well 
as future cash flows has been weakened since the adoption of IFRS 3R which 
implies the information value of current earnings has receded. In addition, quarterly 
earnings reported under IFRS 3 appear to be more volatile after controlling for 
factors influencing earnings volatility such as size, economic shocks and managers’ 
income smoothing behavior. Moreover, this study suggests that earnings volatility 
has a negative effect on earnings persistence over the whole testing period. In 
addition, such effect has amplified since the introduction of IFRS 3R. Following 
Mishkin’s (1983) method of testing market efficiency, this study supports that 
capital market impounds attenuated degree of earnings volatility effect on earnings 
 
 
 
predictability since the application of IFRS 3R. These results should draw the 
attention of both standard setters and public users as the convergence to IFRS from 
domestic GAAP has been a globally debating topic. Thus, standard setters should 
balance the benefits such as improved relevance, reliability and comparability of 
financial reports and costs such as the information loss of earnings when making 
IFRS adoption decisions. Meanwhile, public users should use the financial 
statements with caution, especially when M&A transaction involves.  
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DO FIRMS’ EARNINGS REPORTED UNDER IFRS 3R REVEAL MORE 
ABOUT FUTURE EARNINGS AND CASH FLOWS 
EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Chapter 1 Introduction  
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) comprise a series of accounting 
standards developed by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) in order  
to produce more informative, understandable and comparable financial statements 
across country boundaries. Previous studies have focused on the determinants or 
reasons involved in IFRS adoption. They have also shed lights on various effects 
(including economic and fiscal consequences, accounting quality and capital market 
reaction) of both voluntary and mandatory adoption of IFRS. Mixed findings are 
documented about the outcomes of IFRS adoption. From the positive perspective, 
academics find that the IFRS adoption brings improved comparability, higher 
accounting quality and more accurate analyst forecast (Pownall and Schipper, 1999; 
Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Ball, 2006; Barth et al., 2008; Yip and Young, 2012). On 
the negative side, previous studies also have presented evidence of consistent or even 
increasing earnings management behavior, degraded accounting quality along with the 
IFRS adoption (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Paananen and Lin, 2009).  In addition, 
studies also attribute the positive side of IFRS adoption to firms’ reporting incentives 
and simultaneous enforcement change (Christensen et al., 2008; Christensen et al., 
2013). However, the empirical results of several recent studies have thrown challenges 
to those of previous studies. For example, Pownall and Wieczynska (2012) presents 
evidence that although IFRS has been mandatorily adopted in the European Unions 
(EU), many EU firms actually do not use IFRS in practice and instead they take 
advantage of the definitions, exemptions and deferrals detailed in the regulation to 
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avoid adoption. H. Daske et al. (2013) also provide evidence that the capital market 
actually could distinguish between “serious” and “label” adopters1 by entitling higher 
market liquidity and lower cost of capital to the former, who have stronger reporting 
incentives and commit to produce higher quality financial statements. This result is 
shocking to academics and standard setters as “IFRS adopters” is merely a label and 
many firms are actually resistant to apply IFRS to their financial reporting. Ahmed et 
al. (2013) find that mandatory IFRS adoption accompanies with degradation in 
accounting quality (measured by income smoothing, reporting aggressiveness and 
earnings management to meet or beat a target metrics). According to one accounting 
quality review paper by Dechow et al. (2010), who review three categories of earnings 
quality proxies 2 (properties of earnings, investor responsiveness to earnings and 
external indicators of earnings misstatements) with conclusion that “there is no 
measure of earnings quality that is superior for all decision model”. And the definition 
of earnings quality is contingent on the decision context.  These studies invite 
determination of the underlying reasons for firms’ reluctance to adopt IFRS. In 
addition, most investigations of IFRS discuss all the related accounting standards as a 
group. Although Hamberg el al. (2011) and Bischof (2009) narrow their focus to IFRS 
3 (business combination) and IFRS 7 (financial instruments: disclosure) respectively, 
few studies have ever concentrated on one or a series of related IFRS. Meanwhile, 
previous studies mostly look at the change of pre- and post- adoption of IFRS and no 
study has ever noticed the effect of revision made on IFRS.  
1 “Label adopters” refer to firms adopt IFRS without making material changes to their reporting policies while 
“Serious adopters” are firms adopting IFRS as a broader strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. (H. 
Daske et al, 2013) 
2 Dechow et al. (2010) reviews three categories of earnings quality proxies including properties of earnings, investor 
responsiveness to earnings and external indicators of earnings misstatements. They also demonstrate the difficulty to 
disentangle the fundamental performance on earnings quality from the impact of the measurement system per se.   
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Motivated by several recent studies that have shown inconsistent empirical results 
related to the effects of IFRS adoption with those of previous studies, this paper aim to 
explain the recent findings related to the “label” adopters and the degradation of 
accounting quality that accompanies with IFRS adoption. Furthermore, we focus on 
one or a series of related accounting standards to determine the factors that allow 
standard setters to make specific improvements and avoid the problems associated with 
previous IFRS pool studies at the same time. In addition, we concentrate on the effect 
of IFRS revision rather than comparing various domestic accounting systems with 
IFRS that are commonly documented by previous studies. Last but not least, we narrow 
down to IFRS 3 which is related to merging and acquisition (M&A) transaction 
because it is a core growth strategy for companies. Figure 1 shows the number and 
value of M&A transactions announced around the world and in the Europe zone 
separately. We can observe an increasing trend in M&A transactions as a whole except 
for the period of financial tsunami around 2009.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Our study provides more specific empirical results than others by focusing on a single 
accounting standard: the IFRS 3 (Business Combination) 3 , from the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in the EU in 2005 through to the IFRS 3 revisions that have been 
implemented since July 2009. Our analysis of IFRS 3 and its effects consists of two 
parts. First, we demonstrate the loss of current earnings informativeness related to 
future earnings and cash flows. In addition, we show empirical evidence for the 
increase in earnings volatility and demonstrate its aggravated negative effect on 
seasonal different earnings persistence based on theoretical analysis of IFRS 3 and 
3 Through this study, we use IFRS 3 and IFRS 3R consistently to stand for the original IFRS 3 which took effective 
since March 31, 2004 and the revised IFRS 3 which has been implemented since July 1, 2009. In this paper, we use 
IFRS 3R and new IFRS 3 interchangeably.  
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revised IFRS 3 (IFRS 3R). We find that due to several changes in IFRS 3R, earnings 
seem to convey less information for future accounting numbers which impedes the 
power of current earnings to predict future financial performance. In addition, our 
evidence shows that earnings have fluctuated more violently since the implementation 
of the new IFRS 3 and that this fluctuation has had an incrementally negative effect on 
the autocorrelations of seasonal different earnings. Second, we aim to examine the 
market’s reactions to the loss of earnings intelligence and the volatility effect on time-
series correlations of earnings in a post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) context.  
We find that the capital market is not only underreacting to the loss of current earnings 
informativeness and the earnings volatility effect, but also recognizing it in an opposite 
direction actually. Via a before and after comparison, we find that the market fails to 
absorb the aggregated earnings volatility effect on earnings persistence seriously.  
Our study primarily makes three contributions to the literature. First, it sheds lights 
specifically on IFRS 3 (Business Combination). This single accounting standard 
occupies an indispensable position among other accounting standards as M&A is a 
universal expansion strategy involving huge numbers of firms. This study focuses on 
the relevant changes brought by the revision of IFRS 3. Thus, it actually compares the 
pre- and post-revision in the circumstance of IFRS adoption while previous studies 
mostly focus on comparing pre- and post-IFRS adoption.  Second, we determine the 
influence of IFRS 3R on earnings informativeness and volatility, and the effect of 
earnings volatility on the time-series autocorrelations of seasonal different earnings. 
This is inspiring for both the standard setters and users of the adopters’ financial 
reports. Our results may explain the behavior of those so-called “label” IFRS adopters 
who do not actually use IFRS and also inform the public users of financial statements 
reported under IFRS that they can no longer rely on reported numbers purely for 
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forecasting purposes. Third, we reveal the capital market’s inefficient reaction to the 
effect of earnings volatility on the time-series process of quarterly earnings in a PEAD 
context. This is not surprising, as a “strong-form efficient” market is not expected based 
on previous studies of market efficiency. But our result indicates that the capital market 
doesn’t merely delay its reaction to earnings information. In fact, it ignores it to some 
extent.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we show regulatory 
framework of IFRS in global and European contexts, respectively. Section 3 analyzes 
the changes made in the new version of IFRS 3 and predicts its theoretical effect on 
financial reporting. In Section 4 and 5, we summarize the literature and develop our 
hypotheses based on the previous sections.  Section 6 includes our research design and 
the definition of the variables we use to test our hypotheses. Sections 7 and 8 present 
summary statistics of our sample and the empirical results respectively. Supplemental 
test are conducted in Section 9 to confirm the robustness of our findings and rule out 
other possibilities. Finally, in Section 10, we make conclusions about our results and 
discuss the limitations of our study. 
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Chapter 2 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
2.1 IFRS around the World    
IFRS is widely adopted by jurisdictions around the world, and several countries such as 
the United States, Japan, India, Russia, Malaysia and Columbia are considering their 
adoption in the immediate future.  On 14 November 2008, the US Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) published its Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial 
Statement for comment. It has reiterated the importance of a global convergence of 
accounting standards and the globalization of capital markets in its draft Strategy Plan 
for the 2014-2018 periods. The SEC aims to promote high quality accounting standards 
to meet the needs of investors. Thus, the actual quality of accounting standards is 
remarkable, and their consistent implementation is equally important. In China, with 
the new Chinese Accounting Standards for Business Enterprise (CAS) taking effective 
on January 1, 2007, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is dedicated to converging PRC 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) with IFRS. The MoF released its 
Roadmap for Continuing Convergence of CAS with IFRSs in 2011. More than 100 
countries currently either permit the use of IFRS or adopt policies that converges 
domestic GAAP with IFRS. Given the mass adoption of IFRS and the abundance of 
candidates currently considering adoption, considerable studies have focused on 
determinants and consequences of IFRS adoption.  
Bova and Pereira (2012) explore the reasons for IFRS compliance in a developing 
country.  Their results show that public firms have higher reporting incentives to adopt 
IFRS than private firms. Higher foreign ownership also seems to motivate IFRS 
adoption to fulfill distant investors’ demand for information and avoid information 
asymmetry. Gassen and Sellhoen (2006) examine the determinants of voluntary IFRS 
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adopters in a developed country (Germany) and discover that firm size, international 
exposure and dispersion of ownership each influence the adoption decision. They also 
provide evidence that young firms are attracted to adopting IFRS when they initially go 
public.  
Studies have shown mixed and ambiguous consequences of IFRS adoption. On one 
hands, proponents of IFRS provide evidence that its adoption can enhance accounting 
quality and comparability of financial reports across countries, make financial reporting 
more efficient for cross-listed firms and so forth (Covrig et al., 2007; Turley, 2007; 
Barth et al., 2008; Yip and Young, 2012). For example, Barth et al (2008) developed 
three widely used measures for accounting quality later including earnings 
management, timely loss recognition (conservatism) and value relevance and provide 
evidence that firms voluntarily adopt International Accounting Standards(IAS)4 appear 
to involve less earnings management, recognize loss in a more timely manner and 
convey more information through accounting amounts. Yip and Young (2012) provide 
evidence of an increase in across-country comparability along with mandatory IFRS 
adoption in the EU. They find a significant increase in similarity facet without any loss 
in difference facet during the post-adoption period. However, opponents of IFRS 
adoption throw doubts on the cost-effectiveness and benefits of converging to IFRS 
from domestic GAAP. Gordon et al. (2010) suggest that overall accrual quality, 
earnings predictability and cash predictability between the IFRS and U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) earnings measures do not differ significantly, 
but do vary in terms of financial reporting incentives. Moreover, the SEC has delayed 
making a final decision in relation to the proposed “roadmap” towards the mandatory 
4 In 2001, IAS was renamed to IFRS. In this paper, we use IAS and IFRS interchangeably, but primarily refer to 
IFRS as our sample period starts from the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU.  
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adoption of IFRS, which has also introduced heated debate. In 2009, even SEC 
Chairman Mary Schapiro expressed reservations about the IASB and about the quality 
of IFRS (Forgeas, 2008; Cohn, 2009; Leone, 2009). Ahmed et al. (2013) present results 
that inconsistent with those of Barth et al. (2008), as they find degradation in 
accounting quality measured by income smoothing, reporting aggressiveness and 
earnings management to meet or beat a target. As there is no universal definition of 
accounting quality, the consequences of adopting IFRS have been always controversial.   
2.2 IFRS in Europe  
Although the EU has adopted virtually all of the IFRS standards, it requires time to 
comply with the most recently issued standards. The EU Accounting Regime requires 
that IFRS be adopted on an individual basis in the EU. The adoption process is 
sometimes called “endorsement”. The European Financial Reporting Advisory Group
（ EFRAG） plays an important role in the “endorsement” process by holding 
consultation with interest groups and delivering its advices to the Commission about 
whether the new standard meets the criteria5 for “endorsement”. What’s more, the EU 
has published Commission Regulations in the Official Journal of the European Union 
on December 31, 2004, thereby formally making certain improved International 
Accounting Standards(IAS) and new IFRS part of European law. According to the 
official statement announced by the Council of the Minister of the EU in 2002, all of 
the listed companies in the 28 EU member countries must prepare their consolidated 
financial statements according to IFRS and IAS as of January 1, 2005. Three other 
countries in the Europe Economic Area (Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein) follow  
the EU’s directives, including its accounting directives, despite not being EU member 
5 The criteria include whether it’s contrary to the true and fair view and whether it is conducive to the European 
public good, understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability. 
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countries. This makes the EU a good setting for testing the effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption, as researchers can remove voluntary adopters before IFRS is mandated to 
avoid self-selection bias.  
Many studies have contributed to the costs and benefits of mandatory IFRS adoption in 
the EU. For example, Amstrong et al. (2010) investigate the market reaction to the 
EU’s mandatory IFRS adoption and find that the market reacts more positively for 
firms with lower pre-adoption information quality and higher pre-adoption information 
asymmetry. In addition, they find that code law countries earn a weaker market reaction 
due to their lesser ability to enforce accounting standards. However, Christensen et al. 
(2013) argue that researchers wrongly attribute the increase in market liquidity to the 
mandated IFRS while ignoring the substantive enforcement change simultaneously. 
Most recently, Dinh and Piot (2014) link IFRS adoption in the EU with auditor industry 
concentration from a cross-border perspective.  
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Chapter 3 Regulatory Framework IFRS 3 vs. IFRS 3R  
IFRS 3 (business combinations) outlines accounting principles that acquirers should 
follow once they obtain controls of a business. It requires acquirers to measure the 
assets and liabilities they acquired on the acquisition date at fair value. This is known as 
“acquisition method”. The IFRS 3 took effect for business combinations agreed to on or 
after March 31, 2004. However, shortly after the introduction of IFRS 3, the 
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) published its Exposure Draft in 
relation to several proposed amendments to IFRS 3 in June 2005. In January 2008, the 
IASB issued a revised version of IFRS 3 (IFRS 3R), applying it to business 
combinations with acquisition dates falling at the beginning of the first annual reporting 
period commencing on or after 1 July 2009. This new IFRS 3 will have substantial and 
frequently counter-intuitive consequences on financial statements (Pocket Guide, PwC 
2008). This project is designed to unify M&A accounting across the world’s major 
capital markets. It aims to facilitate investors and their advisers focus on assessing the 
how the activities of the acquirer and its acquired business will combine without 
concerning on the different ways of consolidation. Even more remarkable is that the 
new IFRS 3 is a joint project between the IASB and U.S. Financial Reporting Standard 
Board (FASB), the latter of which later issued a similar Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) 141(R). This could be considered a sign of the FASB’s 
willingness to converge U.S. GAAP with IFRS in the future, as the project is designed 
to unify M&A accounting across the world’s capital market. Cadman et al. (2013) 
explore the economic determinants of earn-out provisions6 in acquisition agreements 
and investigate the information content of earn-out fair value adjustments.  
6 Earn-out clause or contingent considerations refer to consideration payable that depend on the post-acquisition 
performance of target.   
10 
 
                                                          
There are several amendments in IFRS 3R compared with IFRS 3. According to 
EFRAG’s Effects Study Report related to IFRS 3R and IAS 27A, we discuss the 
changes in the new version of IFRS 3 separately according to the three ways in which 
an acquirer may obtain control over a target.  
(1) One-step Acquisition 
In a one-step acquisition, the acquirer buys all of the assets and liabilities of the 
acquiree at once, IFRS 3R introduces two changes related to the treatment of contingent 
considerations and acquisition-related costs. The original IFRS 3 recognizes only 
contingent considerations on the acquisition date if the payment is probable and can be 
reliably measured. Furthermore, it includes the acquisition-related costs into investment 
costs, which influence the goodwill calculation in the later process. However, the new 
IFRS 3 recognizes all contingent considerations and expenses the acquisition-related 
cost immediately on the acquisition date.  
These two changes also affect the following two kinds of acquisition transactions.  
(2) Step Acquisition  
Step acquisition refers to obtaining controlling interest over a business through more 
than one step. One accounting policy change related to step acquisition is that all of the 
identifiable assets acquired previously should be revalued according to fair value, and 
the revaluation amount is no longer recognized in equity but immediately in terms of 
profit and loss.  
(3) Partial Acquisition 
Partial acquisition means that the acquirer achieves control over the acquiree without 
holding all of the latter’s shares or net assets. Such transactions exhibit non-controlling 
11 
 
interest (NCI). The new IFRS reserves the option for “partial goodwill” method in 
extant IFRS 3 by recognize NCI at the proportionate rate of all of the identifiable assets 
while also allowing the new “full goodwill” method by measuring the NCI at fair value.  
The parallel use of both goodwill measurement methods is caused by respondents’ 
negative comments that the IASB is overemphasizing on the fair value of the business 
which they think is unreliable. And it’s also inconsistent with the view that financial 
statements should focus on the parent’s shareholders rather than the non-controlling 
portion of business.  The full goodwill method will increase the equity at the 
acquisition date which seems to be suitable for companies with a weak equity base or 
high leverage but it also requires complicated valuation techniques and raises the 
likelihood of higher impairment charges in the post-acquisition period.  
Meanwhile, the Pocket Guide issued by PricewaterhouseCoopers hints at the effect of 
IFRS 3R. The guide points out that the new IFRS 3 exaggerates the disconnection 
between earnings and cash flows and theoretically leads to the reporting of more 
volatile earnings. This motivates us to empirically test the consequences of IFRS 3R in 
this study.  The word “exaggerate” suggests that such a disconnection already existed in 
the original IFRS 3. However, IFRS 3R allows for a  wider range of intangible assets to 
be recognized on the acquisition date, which makes acquirers suffer from hefty 
amortization charges in the post-acquisition period, especially when the merged cash 
flows of acquirers and acquirees remain unchanged.  The revaluation of previously 
owned assets under the circumstances of step acquisition or partial disposal with a 
change in controlling status results in gains or losses (usually gains) in earnings. 
However, cash flows may go in the opposite directions, as only cash outflows occur in 
this situation. Furthermore, fair value measurement is increasingly and consistently 
present in the new IFRS 3 inducing more fluctuated earnings. The wider application of 
12 
 
fair value measurement includes the previously-held equity interest in step acquisition, 
transaction costs, earn-out clauses, goodwill on non-controlling interest and more 
intangible assets allowed for recognition. 
The only previous study related to IFRS 3 is that by Hamberg et al. (2011) who 
discover an increasing trend in reported earnings and designate it a consequence of the 
replacement of amortizations by the impairment method to ensure goodwill, more 
frequent M&A activities, and managers’ discretion over earnings. They also discover 
that the market reacts to the increasing earnings of goodwill-intensive companies with 
significant upward revaluations during the transition from domestic GAAP to the 
mandatory IFRS adoption. In other words, their study focuses on the original IFRS 
introduced almost simultaneously with the mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU.  
13 
 
Chapter 4 Literature Review  
4.1 Earnings Informativeness  
We focus on the association between current and future earnings and cash flows 
because the conceptual framework issued by IASB at January 1 2013 emphasizes that 
“financial reporting should provide information about the reporting entity that is useful 
to existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions 
about providing resources to the entity”. More specifically, in the Project Summary, 
Feedback and Effect Analysis Report (Business Combinations Phase 2) issued by the 
IASB in January 2008 discloses its assessment process including the “usefulness” 
criteria,  which indicates whether the information in a financial report is useful to users 
in assessing the future cash flows.   
Earnings are commonly used as company performance measures. They are also widely 
used in debt covenant contracts, managers’ appraisal reports and even initial public 
offering (IPO) files. Meanwhile, stakeholders may care more about a firm’s cash 
generating ability, as cash flows are probably subject to less distortion. A series of 
papers by Dechow concentrate on the information content of different earnings 
components for future cash flows.  Dechow et al. (1998) find a clear relation between 
earnings and cash flows based on the discussion of the two conflicting roles of accruals 
in Dechow (1994), and determine that the firm-specific operating cycle has an effect on 
the earnings’ predictability of subsequent cash flows.  One role of accruals is that they 
could mitigate the timing and matching problem suffered by cash flows as a 
performance measure. However, they could also represent a way for managers to 
exercise discretion in managing earnings. According to Dechow (1994), the first role of 
an accrual dominates the second, and increases the association between earnings and 
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future realized cash flows in the future. Furthermore, Dechow and Dichev (2002) find a 
strong positive relation between accrual quality and earnings persistence. Accrual 
quality is measured as the standard deviation of residuals from firm-specific regressions 
of working capital accruals on lag-one, current and lead-one cash flows from operations. 
Their measure of accrual quality includes not only managers’ manipulation, but also the 
unintentional estimation errors embedded in accruals. Earnings persistence is usually 
the regression coefficient of current earnings when future earnings are the dependent 
variables. Thus, earning persistent actually reflects the ability of earnings to forecast 
future earnings, and Dechow and Dichev find that current earnings could be an 
outstanding “predictor” of future earnings. This is consistent with Finger’s (1994) 
finding that earnings per se are significant predictors regardless of whether they follow 
a random walk or time-series model. Taking the accounting system into consideration, 
Atwood et al. (2011) compare the power of earnings to predict future earnings and cash 
flows among firms that follow IFRS, U.S. GAAP and Domestic Accounting Standards 
(DAS). They provide evidence that although earnings exhibit almost equal predictive 
power for future earnings under IFRS and U.S. GAAP in profit-making situations, 
earnings reported under IFRS exhibit less predictive power in loss situations.  
4.2 Earnings Volatility, Persistence and Predictability  
We also look at the change in earnings volatility accompanying the introduction of 
IFRS 3R and the interaction between earnings volatility and earnings persistence. As 
mentioned in Section 3, the new IFRS introduces wider applications of fair value 
measurement and specific rules such as expensing acquisition-related costs 
immediately, leading to the reporting of more volatile earnings. To test whether 
earnings volatility actually increases, we must keep the influencing factors of earnings 
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volatility under control.  As proposed by Copeland (1968), corporate managers have 
incentives to manipulate earnings by lowering the peaks and supporting the troughs to 
lower the earnings variation.  DeFond and Park (1997) documents that managers tend 
to smooth earnings to improve job security. They borrow from future earnings if 
current performance is poor, and conversely, delay current earnings if expected future 
earnings are decreasing. Based on previous researches, Tucker and Zarowin (2006) 
focus on the relation between earnings informativeness and income smoothing and find 
that the earnings information higher-smoothing firms is impounded in stock prices to a 
larger extent than that of lower-smoothing firms. This implies that managers use 
discretion to communicate their assessment of firms’ future performance rather than 
intentionally distort the numbers. A survey study Graham et al. (2005) echoes and 
further supplements the previous archival research results. Via interviews with 400 
chief financial officers, their study provides evidence that managers believe that outside 
users actually attach greater importance to reported earnings rather than cash flows. An 
overwhelming portion (78%) of managers prefer smooth rather than bumpy earnings 
patterns, as they perceive that volatile earnings impairs the predictability of firms’ 
future prospects and that the market actually values that predictability. Even more 
noteworthy is that managers use real economic actions rather than accruals to keep up a 
smoothing accounting appearance.  
Motivated by the survey evidence documented by Graham et al (2005), Dichev and 
Tang (2009) empirically explore the link between earnings volatility and persistence. 
Their results show that earnings volatility is negatively correlated with earnings 
persistence, and that the sources of earnings volatility include economic shocks and the 
accounting determination problems (e.g., mismatching revenue and expense, estimation 
error in accruals) of income. Furthermore, they also provide evidence that investors do 
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not understand the earnings volatility implications for future earnings.7 Frankel and 
Litov (2009) verify the robustness of the negative effect of earnings volatility on 
earnings persistence by adding control variables. However, via return tests8, they find 
contrasting results related to market intelligence and that investors do not significantly 
underestimate the earnings volatility effect. These two studies use annual data for the 
empirical test, in this study we aim to extend this using interim financial data.  
4.3 Market Efficiency Studies  
There are three kinds of studies that test the market’s efficiency under different effects. 
The first type addresses accrual anomalies. Sloan (1996) demonstrates the lower 
persistence of accruals compared with cash flows and discovers the market’s failure to 
fully distinguish the persistence difference between cash flows and the accruals 
component of earnings. By disaggregating the growth in net operating assets into 
accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets, Fairfield et al. (2003) provide 
evidence that the market overvalues both components equivalently. Richardson et al. 
(2005) links the lower accrual reliability with lower earnings persistence which echoes 
Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) finding that accrual quality is positively related to 
earnings persistence. Furthermore, Richardson et al. (2005) detect a significantly 
greater market mispricing for accruals (18% abnormal return annually) than Sloan 
(1996), with a comprehensive definition of accruals 9 . Another series of market 
efficiency studies test whether the market could impound the information embedded in 
various earnings components.  Burgstahler et al. (2002) focus on special items, which 
7 Dichev and Tang (2009) test whether earnings volatility information allows the identification of predictable 
forecast errors using two complementary specifications including control for the level of earnings or level of forecast 
error, respectively. They conclude analysts incorporate partially of the earnings volatility effect in their forecasts.   
8 Frankel and Litov (2009) use return rather than forecast error to remedy the problem of lack of forecast errors and 
find indifferent stock returns between high volatility versus low volatility earnings.  
9 Richardson et al. (2005) define accruals including not only the operation accruals commonly used (e.g. Hayn, 1985; 
and Sloan, 1996) but also many accruals and deferrals relating to non-current operating assets, non-current operating 
liabilities, non-cash financial assets and financial liabilities. 
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are commonly viewed as more transitory than other earnings components, and discover 
that although prices reflect relatively more of the special items effect, they fail to fully 
impound the related implications. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) explain that the market 
tends to absorb the information contained in the “street” earnings numbers (numbers 
announced via corporation press releases) rather than earnings reported under 
accounting standards. The increasing rift between GAAP earnings and “street” earnings 
introduces a new viewpoint that managers try to “manipulate” earnings by persuading 
investors and analysts using newly defined “earnings”. This may clarify the reasons for 
market inefficiency and also provide implications for the declining value relevance of 
earnings in previous studies. Doyle et al. (2003) further develop the informativeness of 
exclusion expenses (such as non-recurring, non-cash and miscellaneous expenses) in 
reported pro forma earnings and find that the market actually values the information 
contained in these transitory items. Finally, Bernard and Thomas (1990) provide the 
first PEAD type of study by identifying the market’s tendency to delay its reaction to 
the earnings surprises until the corresponding quarter in the following year. Bartov et al. 
(2001) explore the relation between PEAD and investor sophistication, which is 
measured by the percentage of stock held by institutional investors, and provide 
evidence that investor sophistication is negatively correlated with PEAD. Bartov’s 
results imply that institutional investors assist with market pricing earnings information 
appropriately and efficiently. Furthermore, Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2011) discover 
a negative correlation between earnings volatility and PEAD by concluding that 
earnings surprise and persistence are equally important for investigating market 
reactions. They also extend the earnings volatility effect on annual earnings persistence 
documented by Dichev and Tang (2009) to quarterly earnings.  
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Chapter 5 Hypotheses Development 
Our first study stems from the important position of earnings. Earnings are widely used 
by investors and creditors and also in executive compensation plans, debt covenants 
contracts and prospectuses of firms seeking to go public (Dechow, 1994). As a superior 
predictor of future firms’ performance to cash flows, earnings informativeness related 
to future prospects has attracted the attention of both standard setters and outside users 
of financial statements (Dechow et al., 1998). In Section 3, we theorize that the 
disconnection between earnings and cash flows becomes exaggerated along with the 
adoption of IFRS 3R. We expect to see a weaker predictive power of earnings for future 
cash flows due to M&A activities. For example, in a step-acquisition, the previously 
acquired assets need to be revalued to fair value on the acquisition date, on this date 
there is cash outflows for acquiring shares of the target while earnings will include the 
revaluation gain or loss. In the post-acquisition year, the revaluation gain or loss will 
not be realized either in the way that acquired assets is resold or is depreciated. Such a 
rift between the current earnings and future cash flows recognition process impairs the 
informativeness of the earnings. 
 Except for a predictor of future cash flows, earnings per se are also significant 
predictors of future earnings. Investors prefer earnings to convey more information 
about future earnings.  However, as earnings now seem to fluctuate to a greater extent, 
the reliability of current earnings as reasonable forecasts of future earnings falls under 
question. Furthermore, few prior studies have shed lights upon the informativeness of 
interim earnings announcements. Thus, we establish our first pair of hypotheses as 
follows:  
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Hypothesis 1.1: Ceteris paribus, the association between current earnings from 
operation and future cash flows from operation weakens with the adoption of IFRS 3R.  
Hypothesis 1.2: Ceteris paribus, the association between current earnings from 
operation and future earnings from operation weakens with the adoption of IFRS 3R. 
In addition to these hypotheses, we demonstrate two sources of earnings volatility that 
have led to vigorous swings in earnings since the implementation of the new IFRS 3. 
One of the sources occurs during the M&A year, when transaction-related costs are 
expensed immediately or a fair value adjustment gain or loss is recognized in the 
earnings for those previously owned shares in a step acquisition.  Another source of 
earnings volatility occurs in the post-acquisition period, when the hefty amortization of 
intangible assets and impairment of goodwill seem to continuously shake earnings 
numbers. The first source comes entirely from the new provision introduced by IFRS 
3R. The second is much more prominent in the new IFRS 3 because it allows for the 
wider application of fair value measurements on the acquisition date, which triggers a 
huge amount of amortization after the transaction.  
However, the according to paragraph BC 158 of the Basis for Conclusion on IFRS 3, 
both the IASB and the FASB believe that the decision usefulness of financial 
statements would be enhanced if intangible assets acquired in a business combination 
are distinguished from goodwill. While the amortization of intangible assets follows a 
fixed pattern thus causes little to earnings volatility. Thus the IFRS revision that pushes 
firm to separate intangible assets from goodwill would in fact reduce earnings volatility.  
In the post-acquisition period, though the amortization of intangible assets represents a 
fixed portion of the fair value of assets, as we mentioned before, one company may 
initiate more than M&A transaction in the middle of the year and the amortization of 
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intangible will also contribute to the volatility of quarterly earnings.  In addition, 
subsequent changes in fair value of the earn-out clause will also add fuel to the flame. 
Meanwhile, the volatility of earnings in subsequent years will be driven by the buyer’s 
ability to assess the probability of the achievement of the pre-determined performance 
objectives on which conditional payment is based. Finally, the impairment of goodwill 
will increase if full goodwill method is adopted as the goodwill of non-controlling 
interest is also included. Therefore, we generate our second hypothesis based on 
earnings volatility trends:  
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, earnings volatility increases with the adoption of IFRS 
3R.  
A prior survey study conducted by Graham et al. (2005) presents managers’ viewpoints 
of the negative relation between earnings persistence and volatility and their preference 
for smoother reported earnings. Empirical studies such as that by Dichev and Tang 
(2009) have documented evidence of the negative correlation between earnings 
volatility and persistence in terms of annual data. Previous studies have documented 
that the time-series properties may differ between annual earnings and quarterly 
earnings. Thus the AR (1) process of annual earnings does not seem to be applicable to 
quarterly earnings. Through a cross-sectional autocorrelation function, Foster (1977) 
concludes that there are two components contained in the quarterly earnings process. 
One is an adjacent quarter-to-quarter component (earnings surprise) and the other is a 
seasonal component (quarterly earnings momentum). In other words, seasonal different 
earnings 10  follow an AR (1) process. However, the relation between annual and 
seasonal difference earnings persistence is unknown, which leads to doubts over the 
10 Seasonal different earnings (SUE) refer to the difference between quarterly earnings and the corresponding quarter 
in the previous year.  
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effect of earnings volatility on SUE persistence. Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2011) 
successfully fill in this gap by confirming a positive relation between annual earnings 
persistence and SUE persistence, and also extend the ex-ante annual earnings volatility 
effect to quarterly earnings. Referring to these previous studies, we must first confirm 
that the effect of earnings volatility on SUE persistence continuously exists in our 
samples. And combined with our second hypothesis, the increase in earnings volatility 
is likely to give rise to a stronger earnings volatility effect on SUE persistence after the 
adoption of IFRS 3R. Thus, we generate our third pair of hypotheses as follows:    
Hypothesis 3.1: Ceteris paribus, earnings volatility has an adverse effect on the 
persistence of standardized seasonal different earnings (SUE).  
Hypothesis 3.2: Ceteris paribus, seasonal different earnings (SUE) persistence is 
further impaired by the increase of earnings volatility following the adoption of IFRS 
3R.  
Foster defines “predictive ability” as not only the ability to forecast future 
values of the same series, but also the capacity to approximate the capital market’s 
expectation model when examining the market’s reaction to accounting data (Foster, 
1977).  As the preceding hypotheses focus on the earnings informativeness, we then 
move on to test the “security valuation” process. Beginning with Bernard and Thomas 
(1990), researchers have detected a drift in stock returns related to earlier earnings 
announcements. This implies that the capital market absorb the information conveyed 
by earnings gradually rather than immediately.  Thus, the so-called PEAD is actually a 
function of earnings surprise. In addition, Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2011) find 
evidence that earnings volatility is negatively related to the PEAD returns and this 
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induces a negative relation between trading frictions and the drift returns.11 Market 
efficiency tests have provided mixed results. Dichev and Tang (2009) contend that 
analysts underestimate the implications of earnings volatility for earnings predictability 
which results in systematic errors in analyst forecasts. But Frankel and Litov (2009) 
conclude that the market can fully understand the implications of earnings volatility 
using a return test. In this study, we analyze the market efficiency under a PEAD 
context where the market delays its reaction to earnings information till later earnings 
announcement.  First of all, previous study show that the market fail to recognize the 
earnings volatility implication on earnings persistence in a stock return test. Under a 
PEAD context, if the market does not only delay its reaction to the earnings 
information, it means that the market leaves out some information in financial reports 
and shows no response to it. Secondly, the revision of accounting standard could by 
totally unfamiliar to market investors and we expect to observe an aggravated earnings 
volatility effect following the adoption of IFRS 3R since July 1st in 2009. A corollary 
of the above, we propose that the market cannot wake up from its deep sleep and omits 
the earnings volatility effect along with the adoption of IFRS 3R to some extent. 
Therefore, we offer our final pair of hypotheses as follows: 
Hypothesis 4.1: Ceteris paribus, the capital market cannot impound the earnings 
volatility effect on earnings persistence.  
Hypothesis 4.2: Ceteris paribus, the extent to which a capital market recognizes the 
implications of earnings volatility decreases following the adoption of IFRS 3R.  
11 According to Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2011), trading fictions is usually used in robustness test of mispricing or 
underreaction in any setting. They find a negative relation between trade fictions and the drift through earnings 
volatility because it is negatively related with PEAD returns and positively related with trading fictions.  
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Chapter 6 Empirical Models and Research Design  
 6.1 The Informativeness of Current Earnings  
To test the informativeness of current earnings for future earnings and cash flows 
across the two sub-periods before and after the adoption of IFRS 3R, we follow the 
models used by Atwood et al. (2011).  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2 POST + 𝛼𝛼3 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 * POST) + Controls + 
𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (1) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛽𝛽2  POST + 𝛽𝛽3  (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  * POST) + Controls + 
𝛹𝛹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛹𝛹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛹𝛹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 +  𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (2) 
where IBQ equals the net income before extraordinary items; CFO equals the cash 
flows from operations, measured as IBQ minus Accruals, where Accruals are calculated 
as the change in noncash current assets less the change in current liabilities plus the 
change in the current portion of long-term debt plus depreciation, following a study by 
Pincus et al. (2007). We scale both IBQ and CFO by average total assets of the most 
recent eight quarters and get IBQS and CFOS, respectively. And Post is a time dummy 
set to one if the calendar quarter follows July 2009 and zero otherwise.  𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
(𝛹𝛹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ), 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  (𝛹𝛹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) and 𝜃𝜃𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶  (𝛹𝛹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 ) are the country, industry and 
firm year fixed effects in the future cash flows (earnings) model respectively.   
The control variables include economic factors such as GDP growth rate, inflation rate, 
population growth rate and the ratio of corporate tax revenue over annual GDP for each 
country.  Our cutoff for the time dummy is within the financial tsunami period. As such, 
we must take economic fluctuation into account. In addition, we control for firm size 
and income-smoothing behavior. The inclusion of firm size as a control variable is 
24 
 
motivated by political process theory, which implies that managers of large, politically 
sensitive firms are inclined to use latitude in accounting in order to avoid political costs 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Watts and Zimmerman 1983). Controlling for firm size 
is also supported by Chaney and Jeter (1992), who observe that the market is more 
likely to impound information from larger firms, as they are exposed to stricter public 
scrutiny. We measure size as the decile rank of market value at the end of the previous 
quarter, transformed to a range from -0.5 to +0.5.  
Income smoothing is defined as a managers’ attempt to use his or her reporting 
discretion to smooth the firm’s earnings realization process. Income-smoothing 
behavior has two-side effects on earnings informativeness: on one hand, it may 
improve earnings informativeness if the manager communicates his or her own 
assessment with the public through his or her discretion over reporting while on the 
other hand it may deteriorate earnings informativeness if the manager only distorts the 
earnings numbers out of self-interest. Tucker and Zarowin (2006) verify that the 
income-smoothing behavior benefits the information contained in the current stock 
price. According to Collins et al. (1994), income-smoothing behavior is measured by 
the correlation of a firm’s change in discretionary accruals with its change in pre-
managed earnings. Collins uses negative correlation, where a more negative measure 
represents higher-income smoothing behavior. In this study, we use positive correlation 
with a more positive measure representing higher income-smoothing behavior.  
The coefficients of interest are 𝛼𝛼1  (𝛽𝛽1 ) and 𝛼𝛼3 (𝛽𝛽3 ) as they imply the association 
between a firm’s current earnings and future cash flows (future earnings) and the 
increment or decrement in earnings informative value in the post-revision period.  We 
expect to see a positive coefficient for current earnings and a negative coefficient for 
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the interaction item in both regressions. This would indicate that earnings convey 
information for future earnings and cash flows, and that the earnings informativeness 
deteriorates along with adoption of IFRS 3R.   
As a supplement to the earnings informativeness test, we run the following regressions 
for the two sub-periods (Post=0 and Post=1) separately to provide a more intuitional 
impression of the change in earnings informativeness. We manually compare the 
informativeness before and after the adoption of IFRS 3R:  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + Controls + 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (3) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + Controls + 𝛹𝛹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  + 𝛹𝛹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  + 𝛹𝛹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶  + 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
(4) 
Furthermore, we discuss the earnings informativeness for future earnings and cash 
flows by partitioning the earnings into positive and negative subsamples. This method 
is commonly adopted in other studies. The rationale is imbedded in studies by Hayn 
(1995) and Collins et al. (1999), who provide solid evidence that negative earnings 
convey less information than positive earnings. More specifically, Hayn (1995) reveals 
that the lower information content contained in negative can explain the consistently 
low earnings return coefficient (ERC) documented previously. In addition, Bartov et al. 
(2005) detect different implications between profit and loss in stock market returns. 
Thus, we are highly encouraged to divide our sample into profit and loss cases to see 
the effect of negative earnings on the earnings informativeness.  
6.2 Earnings Volatility Trend  
To test the effect of IFRS 3 revision on earnings volatility, we use the following simple 
model: 
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𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 POST + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖+ Economic Controls 
+ 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (5) 
The independent variables include the time dummy (POST), size, income-smoothing 
behavior measure and economic controls.  We expect to obtain a positive coefficient for 
the time dummy, which could prove that earnings volatility increases following the 
adoption of IFRS 3R. Firm size may have two opposing effects on earnings volatility.  
First, large firms are well diversified and thus have more stable earnings. Second, our 
sample comprises firms involved in M&A transactions which have an unclear effect on 
earnings volatility suggested by Dichev and Tang (2009). Because size and possible 
diversification effect suggest a negative relation between M&A and earnings volatility 
while poor targeting skills and weak integration effects may induce a positive relation. 
In combination, the coefficient of firm size is unclear. Meanwhile, managers usually 
have incentives to smooth their firms’ earnings using their discretions. Thus, we control 
for income-smoothing behavior and expect a negative relation between income-
smoothing and earnings volatility. Finally, the general operating environment also 
influences earnings volatility, especially for economic shocks. We therefore control for 
economic factors to see how earnings volatility changes with IFRS 3R adoption.  
Our raw measurement of earnings volatility (EVOL) is the variance the earnings from 
the most recent eight quarters (including quarter t) deflated by the moving average of 
total assets over the same period.  We then sort the firm-quarter earnings volatility and 
arrange the firms in deciles. The decile rankings of the firms’ earnings volatility 
(DEVOL: transformed by dividing by 9 and subtracting 0.5) is our alternative measure 
of earnings volatility.  Other variables including POST, Size and Incsmooth are defined 
as in the previous section.  
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6.3 Earnings Volatility Effect  
To test the effect of earnings volatility on earnings persistence, we follow the model 
used by Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2011), as they successfully extends Dichev and 
Tang’s (2009) earnings volatility effect on annual earnings to standardized quarterly 
differenced earnings. The regression model is as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑎0  + 𝑏𝑏0  𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝐼𝐼0  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝑑𝑑0  (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  * 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) + 
Controls + 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1  (6) 
It is necessary to include EVOL as a separate independent variable in the regression to 
eliminate the correlated omitted variable problem. DSUE is the SUE decile ranking for 
each quarter ranging from -0.5 to + 0.5, where SUE is the difference between the 
current quarter’s earnings and the earnings from corresponding quarter in the 
corresponding year. EVOL is the earnings volatility measure, defined as in the previous 
section.  
We expect to observe a positive coefficient for current earnings (𝑏𝑏0) and a negative 
coefficient for the interaction term between current earnings and earnings volatility (𝑑𝑑0).  
If this is the case, it implies that the seasonal different earnings (SUE) follow Foster’s 
model with a positive autocorrelation, and that the persistence varies between low and 
high volatility earnings categories.  
In addition to the preceding model, we control for firm size, loss and the cross-quarter 
effect to test the consistency of the effect of earnings volatility on SUE autocorrelation 
using the following model:  
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑎0  + 𝑏𝑏0  𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝐼𝐼0  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝑑𝑑0  (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  * 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) +  
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𝑔𝑔0𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + ℎ0(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  ∗  𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)  +Controls + 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  + 
𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 (7) 
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑎0  + 𝑏𝑏0  𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝐼𝐼0  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝑑𝑑0  (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  * 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) + 
𝑔𝑔1𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + ℎ0(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  ∗  𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)  +Controls + 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  + 
𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
 
 
(8) 
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑎0  + 𝑏𝑏0  𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝐼𝐼0  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝑑𝑑0  (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  * 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝑔𝑔0𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 
+ℎ0(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  ∗  𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡)  +Controls + 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
 
(9) 
SIZE is defined as in the previous section. LOSS is an indicator variable set to one if the 
current earnings are negative and zero otherwise.  𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 is an indicator variable set to one if 
quarters t+1 and t are in the same fiscal year and zero otherwise.  
To compare the effect of earnings volatility on earnings persistence before and after the 
adoption of IFRS 3R, we estimate the regression as Equation (6) for the two sub-
periods separately and compare the coefficients of the interaction terms between 
current earnings and earnings volatility. We expect the coefficient to be consistently 
negative and become much more negative after the policy change, which would imply 
that the earning volatility effect is strengthened and that the seasonal different earnings 
persistence is further impaired by earnings volatility following the adoption of IFRS 3R.   
6.4 Market Efficiency Test 
We conduct a market efficiency test following the “two-equation method” established 
by Ball and Bartov (1996). Firstly, the “prediction equation” is identical Equation (6).  
Secondly, the “pricing equation” represents the capital market’s response to the forecast 
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error ( 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1) in the prediction equation. Thus, we estimate the following two equations 
simultaneously:  
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑎0  + 𝑏𝑏0  𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝐼𝐼0  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝑑𝑑0  (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  * 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) + 
𝑔𝑔0𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +ℎ0(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  ∗  𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1  (10) 
𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0+𝛽𝛽0 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 + µ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 (11) 
The simultaneous estimation reflects whether the relation between the future and 
current earnings and the interaction between current earnings and earnings volatility 
stay the same as those observed when regressing the future earnings on current earnings 
and the interaction term.   𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1 in Equation 10 represents the earnings surprise or 
earnings innovation emerged in the earnings process. If the market is efficient at 
forecasting earnings and the earnings volatility effect, then it should react only to the 
earnings surprise. In other words,  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1 in Equation 11 should be identical to  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1 in 
Equation 10.  Thus, we substitute  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1 into Equation 10 and obtain the following: 
𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0-𝛽𝛽0𝑎𝑎0∗  +𝛽𝛽0𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1  -𝛽𝛽0𝑏𝑏0∗  𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  - 𝛽𝛽0𝐼𝐼0∗  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  - 𝛽𝛽0𝑑𝑑0∗ 
(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 * 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) - 𝛽𝛽0𝑔𝑔0∗𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 - 𝛽𝛽0ℎ0∗(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  ∗  𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
+ µ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
 
 
(12) 
Comparing Equations 10 and 12, 𝑏𝑏0 and 𝑑𝑑0 are the actual coefficients of the current 
earnings and earnings-volatility interaction term while 𝑏𝑏0∗  and 𝑑𝑑0∗  are the inferred 
coefficients correspondingly. A post-estimation of the actual and inferred coefficients 
should determine whether the market can fully impound the information contained in 
the earnings and earnings volatility into a stock price.  
 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return, calculated as the raw stock 
return adjusted for the CRSP value-weighted index including dividends. The other 
variables are defined as in the previous section.  
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Several other studies conduct the Mishkin test (Rangan and Sloan, 1998; Cao and 
Narayanamoorthy, 2011) to measure the extent to which the market recognizes the 
intertemporal properties of seasonal different earnings and the effect of earnings 
volatility on such a quarterly earnings process. In this study, we focus more on the 
change in market intelligence before and after the accounting policy change. Our 
expectation is that the market is inefficient at including all of the information contained 
in earnings and is less intelligent following the adoption of IFRS 3R.  
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Chapter 7 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
7.1 Sample and Data Collection  
As a typical feature of capital markets, business combination transactions have 
increased sharply over the past decades. In 2013, there were over 30,000 M&A 
transactions made worldwide, with a value exceeding USD 2 billion on average. The 
large number of M&A transactions provides a good testing platform for our study of 
IFRS 3/3R.  
Our sample consists of 374 listed firms from 20 EU member countries, spanning a 
period from the EU’s mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 to the most recent data for 
2013. In this study, we split the examination period into two sub-periods using the 
IFRS 3R effectiveness date (July 1, 2009) as the cutoff. All sample Firms were required 
to be public and are acquirers involved in M&A transactions both before and after IFRS 
3R adoption. These companies are required to prepare consolidated financial statements 
under the guidance of IFRS 3/ 3R. Listed companies in EU countries have been 
mandated to adopt IFRS since January 2005 and the change in earnings informativeness 
along with IFRS 3R can only be tested for firms consistently affected by IFRS.  In this 
study, we do not put any restriction on target companies in terms of incorporation 
country and listing status. Some may argue that the endogeneity problem can be 
avoided if the acquisition dates for each firm are used as the cutoff dates. However, in 
our sample, 345 out of 374(92.24%) firms made more than one M&A transactions 
before adopting IFRS 3R, and 171 (45.72%) firms made repeat M&A transactions 
during the short post-revision period. Using the acquisition dates as cutoff dates would 
not only result in multiple cutoffs for one firm, but also mix up the expected effect due 
to the overlapping of the pre-acquisition period of one transaction and post-acquisition 
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period of the previous transaction and produce confusing results. We obtain our M&A 
transactions data from Thomson. ONE for the 2005-2012 period, and firms that made 
M&A transactions in either of the two sub-periods only were excluded. To be included 
in the sample, firms were required to have accounting data available in the 
COMPUSTAT GLOBAL Fundamental Quarterly Files. They were also required to have 
monthly unadjusted price (UP) and market value of equity (MVE) data available from 
DataStream.  In addition, the economic factors used as control variables in our study 
were captured from the World Bank Database. Our sample comprises 13,464 firm-
quarterly observations.    
The reason we use quarterly data is because it could better capture the influence 
brought by the revision of IFRS 3. The samples included in our study are firms have 
merging and acquisition transactions both before and after the revision of IFRS 3.  And 
the distribution of M&A transactions in each quarter is as shown in Figure 3.  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
The vertical axis of the above line chart is the number of M&A transactions in each 
quarter on the horizontal axis while Quarter 1 starts from first quarter in 2005 and 
Quarter 32 ends at fourth quarter in 2012.  We can observe that the number of M&A 
transactions is evenly distributed except a sharp downturn around the financial tsunami 
(year 2008 to 2009, quarter 17 to quarter 24).  As mentioned in Chapter 3, quarterly 
data could better capture the influence brought by the sequential M&A transaction such 
as the acquisition related cost and the revaluation of previously acquired assets.  
Because the immediate recognition of acquisition cost, contingent consideration and 
revaluation could be cancelled out to some uncertain extent if we use annual data. Even 
though amortization of intangible assets should follow a regular pattern, but one M&A 
33 
 
transaction in the middle of a year would change the amortization pattern of quarterly 
earnings though such change would be minor in respect of annual earnings.      
Another reason we choose to use quarterly data is that in this study we aim at exploring 
the impact of IFRS 3’s revision as well as the capital market reaction to such standard 
change.  And interim financial reporting (quarterly data in this study) is very important 
for investors to make their investment decision though its reliability has always been 
under concern.  In addition, quarterly data per se provides a good testing platform for 
market efficiency as forecast errors of quarterly earnings based on seasonal random 
walk model should not be auto correlated if the market could fully impound all prior 
earnings information. In addition, Bernard and Thomas (1989) identify the delayed 
stock market reaction to the seasonal differenced earnings (SUE) which is positively 
related with adjacent quarters but negatively related with four quarters apart. All above 
implies that quarterly earnings process is closely tied with the market intelligence.  
Other reasons for using quarterly data include: firstly, we want to explore the earnings 
volatility effect on quarterly earnings as such effect on annual earnings has already be 
tested in prior studies; secondly, as we only obtain 374 firms in our sample, annual data 
may make the sample size unpersuasive.  
To test the change of earnings informativeness in H1.1 and H1.2, the sample sizes were 
decreased to 9,719 and 12,214 observations, respectively. Excluded firms might have 
had missing cash flow from operations values, calculated as income before 
extraordinary items minus accruals. Many firms did not report their current portion of 
long-term debt which leads to missing values for accruals and cash flows from 
operations.  
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To examine the earnings volatility change proposed in H2, our sample consists of 
12,523 firm quarterly observations for both earnings volatility measures (the raw and 
decile ranking measure).  
Our entire sample for the earnings volatility effect test includes 11,580 firm quarter 
observations, with 5,869 observations in period 1 before IFRS 3R implementation and 
5,711 observations in the post-revision period.  
The market efficiency test in the final phase contains 11,670 firm quarter observations, 
and there are 5,918 and 5,752 observations for the pre- and post- revision period, 
respectively.  
In summary, our sample size is sufficient and representative and it facilitates the 
generalization of our empirical results to a wider scope.  
7.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample Companies 
Quarterly earnings and cash flows data for 2005-2013 were obtained from Compustat. 
We measure earnings (IBQ) using the Compustat data item “income before 
extraordinary items”. The cash flows from operations (CFO) are calculated by 
subtracting accruals from the earnings, with accruals calculated as the change in 
noncash current assets minus the change in current liabilities plus the change in the 
current portion of long-term debt plus depreciation, following a study by Pincus et al. 
(2007). We choose the moving average of the total assets (ATQ) from the most recent 
eight quarters (AT) as the scaling factor of the earnings and cash flows data (IBQS and 
CFOS correspondingly). SUE refers to the change in current earnings from the earnings 
of the corresponding quarter in the previous year. We use the previous fiscal quarter’s 
closing market value as the scaling factor for SUE where the market value is obtained 
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from DataStream as the “market value of equity (MVE)”.  We then measure DSUE as 
the transformed decile ranking of scaled SUE with a range from -0.5 to +0.5. Following 
Dichev and Tang (2009), we measure earnings volatility (EVOL) as the variance of the 
earnings for the most recent eight quarters deflated by the moving average of the total 
assets. We also used the scaled (from -0.5 to +0.5) decile rank of earnings volatility, as 
most estimation in the PEAD literature are based on pooled firm-quarter deciled level 
data. For the company’s raw stock return, we adopt a one-quarter-long window 
beginning on the first day of each calendar quarter and ending one day before the next 
calendar quarter. We calculate the firm’s stock return data using the monthly unadjusted 
price data from DataStream.12 The market stock return data were obtained from the 
Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly file using the value-weighted 
return including dividends. We then calculate abnormal return (Abreturn) by subtracting 
CRSP value-weighted index return from company’s raw stock return. Size is the decile 
rank of the market value at the end of the previous quarter, ranging from -0.5 to +0.5 
after some transformation. Referring to Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2011), we add two 
indicator variables: Loss which is set to one if the current earnings are negative and 
zero otherwise, and 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡which is set to be one if there is no cross-year effect among the 
independent and dependent variables. By transforming SUE, EVOL and MVE into 
decile ranks, the effect of outliers can be undermined. Furthermore, the near-zero mean 
and range at one entitles implications for the coefficient of DSUE. For example, in a 
return regression, the coefficient of DSUE may represent the abnormal return obtained 
from a zero investment strategy.  Appendix 1 presents the summary of variable data 
source and definition in details.  
12 For the firm’s stock return, we use the unadjusted price (UP) at the end of each quarter and calculate the return as 
(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 -𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1)/ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1.  
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics used in our analysis.  Panel A of Table 1 
presents the descriptive statistics of the variables defined previously. There should be 
13,464 firm-quarterly observations in total as we obtain 374 firms and 36 quarters from 
year 2005 to 2013.  However, the table indicates that almost every variable suffers from 
a missing value problem. In the last five columns, we tabulate the descriptive statistics 
for two sample periods pre- and post- the adoption of IFRS 3R separately. And in the 
last column, we calculate the mean difference of each variable. Cash flows from 
operation fall significantly from positive to negative along with the adoption of IFRS 
3R. And the univariate analysis also reveals an increasing trend in terms of earnings 
volatility (EVOL) as the difference is significantly different under a t-test.  
Panels B and C of Table 1 shed additional lights upon firm-level observation 
characteristics and the M&A transactions composition in our sample. Panel B shows 
that the average M&A frequency before IFRS 3R implementation is 10.97, which is 
much higher than the average during the post-revision period (1.88). This seems 
contrary to the previous findings, as evidence has shown that IFRS adoption increases 
foreign direct investment and cross-border investment (Gordon et al., 2012; Louis and 
Urcan, 2013). The global financial tsunami and the shorter post-revision period may 
provide alternative explanations.  Panel C shows the category compositions of all of the 
M&A transactions in our sample.  It is obvious that one-step acquisition (acquiring 100% 
of an acquiree’s shares or net assets in an one-off transaction) and partial acquisition 
(obtaining control over an acquiree with less than 100% of the holdings) account for the 
vast of majority of transactions observed.  
 [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
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Table 2 shows the sample distribution by country and industry. Panel A of Table 2 
presents the distribution of the 20 countries and indicates that observations from France, 
Sweden and Germany comprise more than half of the sample observations (52.40% in 
total). German firms are the most frequently tested firms in IFRS studies. Because 
German has a strong legal system in terms of its rules of law and the efficiency of its 
judicial system in ensuring compliance with the chosen accounting standards (Hung 
and Subramanyam, 2007). In Contrast, Sweden has been criticized for not cooperating 
actively with other EU members in complying with IFRS. Each EU member state is 
required to set up an independent institution to oversee the compliance of its financial 
reports with IFRS. But in Sweden, the responsibility of ensuring IFRS compliance was 
delegated to a private body from 2003 to 2007. Though this field of work was taken 
back by the stock exchange later, another private body will probably take over this 
again in the immediate future. Furthermore, according to Paananen (2008), evidence 
indicates a significant degradation in accounting quality in Sweden, especially for 
committed adopters. This composition populates our sample with various compliance 
levels and we could cancel out the effect of the legal system.  
In addition, the sample industry distribution in Panel B indicates that our sample spread 
over 10 different industries and most of them come from the high-technology and 
industrial firms (37.96% in total). We remove 144 observations from the finance 
industry (four firm observations from Austria, Belgium, Cyprus and Sweden, 
respectively) though the IFRS adoption in these four countries includes the banking and 
assurance industry. Because these companies may be subject to different regulations, 
we exclude them from the sample.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
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7.3 SUE Persistence and Abnormal-returns-based Case  
Before testing our hypotheses, we must verify whether our sample has the same 
properties as those of previous studies. Table 3 presents our verification of the SUE 
autocorrelation pattern and abnormal return regression pattern. We use the following 
model to test the SUE autocorrelation property:  
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘=𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘+𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 , k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results of this regression for the full sample and 
extreme quintiles based on earnings volatility. Consistent with the pattern documented 
by Bernard and Thomas (1990), we observe a positive-positive-positive-negative (+ + + 
-) pattern from lags one to four. The autocorrelation decreases from 0.390 at lag one to 
-0.216 at lag four, which reveals deteriorated earnings persistence as the predictive 
horizon increases. For comparison purposes, we also present the result from Rangan 
and Sloan (1998) in column (2) under the table and find that we obtain similar results 
across different samples. In addition to the full sample regression results, we report the 
regression results for the highest and lowest earnings volatility quintiles separately. In 
line with the full sample regression result, the earnings predictive power deteriorates 
over a longer predictive horizon for both subsamples. Moreover, we observe a stronger 
autocorrelation and higher 𝑅𝑅2  value for the low-volatility firms than for the high-
volatility firms. The overall results imply that earnings volatility has a notable effect on 
earnings predictive power.   
Panel B of Table 3 shows the abnormal return regression results over a quarterly 
window. The estimation model is as follows: 
𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘=𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘+𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 , k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 
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We do not observe a pattern similar (+ + + -) to those of previous studies. Instead, we 
obtain a straight positive pattern that has an overall decreasing trend except for the 
returns surrounding the earnings announcement two quarters ahead. And the sharp 
decrease in the coefficient of 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 at lag two may be caused by the more space of 
manager’ discretion in interim than year-end financial reports and the market could 
recognize this by underreacting to the interim earnings announcement. Based on our 
result, an abnormal return at 0.15% could be earned by adopting a PEAD strategy (by 
going long and short on the highest and lowest SUE deciles, respectively).  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
7.4 Quarterly Earnings Persistence and Earnings Volatility  
Following Dichev and Tang (2009) and Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2011), we test the 
effect of earnings volatility on earnings persistence using Foster’s model.  The earnings 
volatility is measured as mentioned in Section 7.2, and we further assign firms into 
quintiles based on their earnings volatility rankings. After replacing quarterly earnings 
with a SUE, we obtain the following model:  
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1=α +β 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the earnings persistence (coefficient β) and the 𝑅𝑅2 value for 
the preceding regression along with the earnings volatility quintiles.  Q1 is the quintile 
of firms that exhibit the lowest earnings fluctuation, and correspondingly Q5 is the 
quintile of firms that exhibit the highest earnings volatility.  The results show that the 
earning persistence coefficient decreases from 0.472 in Q1 to 0.311 in Q5, and that 
both the 𝑅𝑅2 and adjusted 𝑅𝑅2  values decrease by half from 20% to 10%.  
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Aside from Foster’s model, Brown and Han (2000) points out that nearly 20% of firms 
have a quarterly earnings process consistent with the AR (1) model. In cases where 
Dichev and Tang (2009) testify that earnings volatility has an adverse effect on annual 
earnings persistence, we aim to extend earnings volatility effect from annual to 
quarterly earnings. Thus, in the Panel B of Table 4, we report the autocorrelation 
coefficient of the quarterly earnings according to the earnings volatility quintiles. The 
model is as follows:  
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1=α + θ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
The autocorrelation of quarterly earnings decreases from 0.762 to 0.514 from the 
bottom to the earnings volatility quintile to the top quintile. Meanwhile, the 𝑅𝑅2 and 
adjusted 𝑅𝑅2values deteriorate from 54% to 28%.  
The results in both panels imply that earnings volatility is inversely related to the 
persistence of both quarterly earnings and seasonal differenced earnings.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
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Chapter 8 Empirical Results  
8.1 Earnings Informativeness  
This section focuses on the information contained in current earnings that relates to 
future earnings and cash flows. Previous studies have pointed out that earnings are 
superior predictor for future accounting numbers because accruals could mitigate the 
timing and matching problem when cash flow is used as a predictor. However, as 
documented in previous sections, IFRS 3R adoption leads to a wider gap between 
earnings and cash flows that may result in a loss of informativeness for earnings. Thus, 
we test the extent to which public users of financial statements can rely on the earnings 
numbers to forecast future firm performance.  
8.1.1 Current Earnings and Future Cash Flows  
Panels A and B of Table 5 shows the regression results with the same variation in the 
models.  Model 1 is similar to Equation 1 but lacks the interaction term between the 
current earnings and time dummy. Model 2 is identical to Equation 1. And Models 3 
and 4show the regressions for profit and loss cases, respectively.  
The coefficient of current earnings (IBQS) is consistently positive and significant 
except for the loss situation in the final column. This confirms that current earnings 
carry information that can be used to forecast for future cash flows. It is also consistent 
with previous studies that less information is imbedded in negative earnings (Hayn, 
1995; Collins et al, 1999;). We also observe a significantly negative coefficient for the 
earnings-time dummy interaction term (IBQS*POST), which supports our hypothesis 
that earnings informativeness deteriorates following the adoption of IFRS 3R. 
Comparing Models 3 and 4, we find that the current earnings coefficient deteriorates 
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from 0.477 to 0.0775, which implies that firms who make profit and adopt IFRS 3R 
suffer more from the loss of earnings informativeness. In addition, we observe that the 
control variables have a consistent effect on future cash flows.  A positive relation 
between firm size and future cash flows is reasonable, as large scale firms have a higher 
cash-generating ability. Furthermore, income-smoothing behavior seems to have an 
inverse influence on future cash flows, which may be caused by managers recognize 
future earnings in advance to maintain a stable growth of income. 
8.1.2 Current Earnings and Future Earnings  
Panel B in Table 5 presents the results of current earnings informativeness related to 
future earnings. The model setting is similar to that in Panel A. In Model 2, current 
earnings have a significantly positive coefficient, and the interaction term has a 
significantly negative coefficient. Although this reveals that current earnings are good 
predictor for future earnings, their predictive power weakens following IFRS 3R 
adoption. A comparison between columns 3 and 4 in Panel B exhibits the similar extent 
in terms of deterioration on information value for future earnings.  
8.1.3 Longer Forecast Horizon  
Following Atwood el al. (2011), we extend our forecast horizon from one to two 
quarters ahead to determine whether the informativeness of earnings and earnings 
volatility effect reverse within a longer predict slot. Thus, we replace the dependent 
variable with the average of future earnings and cash flows using data based on one and 
two quarters ahead. This test is triggered by previous studies such as that by 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (1995), who states that the importance of forecasted earnings for 
forecasting stock prices increases along with the forecast horizon. Thus, extending the 
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prediction period may ensure that a lower amount of information contained in earnings 
is indeed caused by policy changes rather than transitory items over a short horizon.  
The last column in Panel A and B of Table 5 shows the regression results for the longer 
forecast horizon. We obtain similar results, implying that the earnings reported under 
the new IFRS 3 bear less information related to future firm performance. By using the 
average of future cash flows 1 and 2 quarters ahead, current earnings seem to suffer less 
information loss than 1 quarter ahead situation. But for future earnings, current earnings 
still suffer largely from the deterioration on their informativeness.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
8.2 Earnings Volatility Change  
In this section, we aim to uncover the change in earnings volatility along with IFRS 3R 
adoption. We use the model previously presented as Equation 5 to conduct the test.  We 
use two measures of earnings volatility. The first is the raw earnings variance of a firm 
scaled by its average total assets (EVOL). The second is the decile ranking of the 
earnings variance (DEVOL), transformed by dividing by 9 and subtracting 0.5, with the 
result ranging from -0.5 to +0.5.  
Table 6 shows earnings volatility tendency along with the introduction of the revised 
IFRS 3. We observe a constantly positive coefficient for the time dummy POST, which 
is set at one following the implementation of IFRS 3R in July 2009 and zero otherwise.  
The decile ranking measurement of  earnings variance has a more significant increasing 
trend than the raw earnings volatility measurement. This is reasonable because two 
important control variables Size and Incsmooth have similar range. This result supports 
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our second hypothesis that IFRS 3R adoption leads to greater fluctuation in reported 
earnings.  
For the control variables included in the estimation model, income-smoothing behavior 
seems to be inversely related to earnings volatility except in column 2. This indicates 
that managers use their discretions to create earnings with stable growth. The 
consistently positive coefficients of size imply that although large firms are well 
diversified, the weak integration and the poor targeting problem embedded in M&A 
transactions dominates the diversification effect. The underlying rationale could be that 
large firms have more merging and acquiring capacity and would like to take every 
chance, as long as the transactions have favorable prospects. In this way, earnings 
volatility is positively related with firm size. In addition, economic controls have an 
effect upon earnings volatility. Our finding of the increase in earnings volatility is 
robust to controls for country and industry fixed effects.   
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
8.3 Earnings Volatility Effect  
In this section, we test the influence of earnings volatility on the autocorrelation of 
standardized seasonal different earnings. We then focus on whether the increased 
earnings volatility further impairs the earnings persistence of seasonal different 
earnings.  
Panel A of Table 7 presents the regression results for six models. Model 1 is the same 
as Equation 6 presented in Section 6. Model 2 is an independent test of the effect of 
firm size on the autocorrelations of seasonal different earnings. Models 3-5 correspond 
with Equations 7-9 testing the robustness of the earnings volatility effect to size, loss 
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and the cross-quarter effect, respectively. Model 6 test size and cross-quarter effect 
simultaneously. First, we observe consistently positive coefficients for the current 
earnings and negative coefficients for the earnings-volatility interaction term 
consistently in all of the models. This reaffirms that current earnings convey 
information related to future earnings to some extent. Second, the autocorrelations of 
seasonal different earnings deteriorate sharply under the effect of earnings volatility. 
And this effect is immune to size, negative earnings and the cross-quarter effect. The 
result of Model 2 shows that size is negatively related to earnings persistence. This 
result contradicts Cao and Narayanamoorthy’s (2011) result, as they detect a positive 
correlation between size and earnings persistence. As explained in Section 6.2, size is 
expected to have two-sided effects on earnings persistence. For our sample comprising 
firms that made at least two M&A transactions during the study period, firm size is 
positively correlated with M&A transaction frequency 13 . Meanwhile, the weak 
targeting and integration problem linked with M&A may result in a negative correlation 
between M&A activities and earnings persistence. Thus, through M&A activities, size 
is negatively related to earnings persistence due to the particularity of our sample firms. 
We find no negative effect of loss on earnings persistence, and we attribute this result 
to the small proportion of negative earnings in our entire sample (only 
2,225observations with negative earnings out of 13,464 observations).  
Furthermore, our regression results in the final two columns show a negative cross-
quarter effect on earnings persistence. Several studies have provided possible 
explanations for this effect. Kross and Schroeder (1990) detects that the interim and 
fourth-quarter earnings announcements of small firms exhibit a significant 
informativeness difference, and argue that large firms are under the close watch of 
13  The correlations between firm size and M&A transaction frequency (P1_no and P2_no) are 0.501*** and 
0.237***, respectively.  
46 
 
                                                          
regulatory parties and the public.  Mendenhall and Nichols (1988) also provide 
evidence that year-end earnings surprises, especially bad news, experience a lower 
market response than earnings surprises announced during the interim period. Because 
it is more convenient for managers to use discretion over interim reporting than annual 
reporting, they tend to delay bad news until year end. In addition, Salamon and Stober 
(1994) take sales seasonality into account when they explore the cause of the low ERCs 
found in previous studies. Their results show that fourth-quarter earnings 
announcements face a floundering response from the capital market after controlling 
for the peak-quarter effect.  All of these studies demonstrate that fourth-quarter 
earnings contain noises, which the market settles by underreacting to them.  Our result 
is consistent with the explanation that fourth-quarter earnings have a lower predictive 
power than the first-quarter earnings in the following year.   
Panel B of Table 7 reports the same six regression models as Table 7, only over a 
longer prediction span. The results imply a consistent negative effect of earnings 
volatility on earnings persistence that is robust to firm size, loss and the cross-quarter 
effect.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
We further test and compare the earnings volatility effect before and after the 
implementation of IFRS 3R. The model is identical to Equation 6 and we make 
separate estimations for the pre-and post-revision periods. We use two sets of earnings 
volatility measurements to confirm the consistency of our results. In the raw scaled 
earnings volatility settings, we observe an increase in the earnings volatility effect from 
-0.0002 to -0.00052 and the difference is significant with a chi-square value of 18.85. 
We find similar results for the decile ranking of the scaled earnings volatility setting, as 
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the earnings-volatility interaction coefficient increases from -0.178 (with z-statistics of 
-3.82) to -0.248 (with z-statistics of -5.57), and the difference between these two 
coefficients is significant with a chi-square value of 45.95. According to these results, 
earnings persistence is further impaired by an increase in earnings volatility. This result 
also shows that size has a continuously negative effect on future earnings. Furthermore, 
the decrease in terms of adjusteed 𝑅𝑅2value from 17.1% (17.4%) to 14.1% (14.8%) 
reminds us that IFRS 3R adoption may lead to a loss of earnings informativenss.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
8.4 Market Efficiency Test  
In this section, we test whether the capital market can fully absorb the relation between 
current and future earnings and the effect of earnings volatility on earnings persistence. 
Following the “two-equation method” developed by Ball and Bartov (1996), we 
analyze how the market understands the earnings process and the role of earnings 
volatility in such a process. Furthermore, we compare the market intelligence related to 
earnings autocorrelation and the effect of earnings volatility to determine whether the 
increase in earnings volatility further confuses the stock market.  
Table 9 shows that our market efficiency test takes the form of the Mishkin test (1983). 
The first column is the test for the full sample, and the second and third columns are 
separate tests for the pre- and post-revision periods. Parameters 𝑏𝑏0 and 𝑑𝑑0 are the actual 
coefficients for the earnings forecast equation (Equation 10) and 𝑏𝑏0∗  and 𝑑𝑑0∗  are the 
inferred coefficients from the pricing equation (Equation 12).  
with previous results. However, in terms of the inferred coefficients, the coefficient of                                     
current earnings (𝑏𝑏0∗) is negative. This implies that the stock market not only fails to 
48 
 
fully impound quarterly earnings persistence into stock prices, but also recognizes it in 
an opposite directions. A post-estimation test shows that coefficients 𝑏𝑏0  and 𝑏𝑏0∗  are 
significantly different with a chi-square of 4.33. In terms of the coefficient of the 
earnings-volatility interaction term, although we obtain two significantly negative 
coefficients, the post-estimation test reveals that the market underestimates the effect of 
earnings volatility on earnings persistence with a chi-square of 3.91.  
When comparing market efficiency before and after the implementation of IFRS 3R, 
we observe that the market has continuously misunderstood the autocorrelation of 
quarterly difference earnings (SUE). However, the market has gradually eliminated this 
misunderstanding, as the results show a difference in coefficients of current earnings 
(𝑏𝑏0-𝑏𝑏0∗) at 1.371 (with a chi-square value of 6.60) for the pre-revision period and 0.507 
(with chi-square value of 3.15) for the post-revision period. Our results show that the 
market recognized the effect of earning volatility on earnings persistence to some 
extent during the pre-revision period, as the actual and inferred coefficients for the 
earnings-volatility interaction term are not significantly different. However, the market 
has failed to impound the increase in earnings volatility and its aggregated effect 
following the implementation of IFRS 3R, as the coefficient of earning-volatility 
interaction term is less negative in the pricing equation than that in forecasting equation. 
In addition, it is worth mentioning that a horizontal comparison of 𝑑𝑑0 in the final two 
columns of Table 9 could reconfirm an increase in the earnings volatility effect.  
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
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Chapter 9 Robustness Checks 
9.1 Other EU Listed Firms under IFRS 
An important issue for this study analyzing consequences around IFRS 3R adoption is 
whether the observed outcomes could be attributed to the revision of IFRS 3 in 2009. 
Therefore, we must rule out the effect of other IFRS standards, especially those that 
experienced changes in the same year. According to the official IASB website, most of 
the accounting standards amended in 2009 were related to financial instruments, 
including IAS 32 (Financial Instruments: Presentation and Classification of Rights 
Issues), IFRS 9 (Financial Instruments: Replacement of IAS 39) and IFRS 7 (Financial 
Instruments: Disclosure). Other revised standards include general guidelines such as 
IFRS 1 and IAS 1, related to the first-time adoption of IFRS and the presentation 
format of financial statements, respectively. To address the concern that we may 
include the influence of the entire IFRS accounting system rather than only that of 
IFRS 3 in our tests, we conduct the tests again using a sample of EU listed firms but 
without any M&A transactions made during the study period. Thus, this sample 
consists of firms that adopted IFRS without applying IFRS 3 or IFRS 3R in practice. If 
this sample does not lead to the same result documented earlier, we can safely infer that 
the informativeness loss, increased earnings volatility and more profound earnings 
volatility effect and the market inefficiency are induced by the adoption of IFRS 3R. 
However, if we find similar results in this sample, we must be careful in accounting for 
our results.   
Table 10 shows the results related to the earnings predictive power for future cash 
flows and earnings for firms that adopted IFRS but did not use IFRS 3 in practice. The 
four models in this table provide a setting identical to that in Table 5. In Panel A of 
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Table 5, we observe that the information conveyed by current earnings increase rather 
than decrease from the Model 2, as there is a significantly positive coefficient (0.257) 
for the earnings-time dummy interaction term.  In addition, a simple comparison of 
Models 3 and 4 indicates that earnings carry more information after the cutoff with an 
increasing adjusted 𝑅𝑅2value that contracts with the result of the firms that actually 
adopted IFRS 3 in their financial reports.  In Panel B, we find similar results, 
demonstrating that the firms that complied with IFRS but did not practice IFRS 3/3R 
experienced no informativeness loss in their reported earnings.  
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
Table 11 shows the test results for the change in earnings volatility. We mostly obtain 
positive but insignificant coefficients for the time dummy. However, we observe a 
significantly positive coefficient in the third column, implying a sharp increase in 
earnings volatility. This observation does abate once we control for the fixed effect. 
The weak growth in earnings volatility can be explained by the widespread application 
of fair value accounting in the IFRS accounting regime.  
[INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
This result strengthens our confidence that IFRS 3R adoption causes a loss of earnings 
informativeness. We ring the bells for public users who rely on financial statements of 
corporations, and call for their carefulness in forecasting the future performance of 
firms when M&A transactions come into play. 
9.2 Financial Tsunami Sensitivity Test 
The time dummy we use in this study overlaps with the period of financial tsunami to 
some extent. According to Mala & Chand (2012), though the adoption of Fair Value 
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Accounting (FVA) is blamed to be the contributing factor of the financial crisis, the 
majorities of countries intending to adopt IFRS in the near future are not affected by the 
global financial crisis and are still committed to adopt IFRS as planned. Therefore, we 
exclude the year 2008 and 2009 observations to test the sensitivity of our results subject 
to financial crisis. Table 12 presents all the main results of this study when observations 
from first quarter in year 2008 to fourth quarter in 2009 are excluded. Panel A, B and C 
could be compared to Table 5, 6 and 7 correspondingly. The results are consistent with 
previous ones which indicates that our result is insensitive to financial tsunami.  
[INSERT TABLE 12 HERE] 
9.3 Enforcement Environment  
First of all, H. Daske et al. (2013) point out that the existence of “label adopters” of 
IFRS and the market is sufficiently intelligent to distinguish the serious adopters from 
those labelled ones. It makes us wonder that if the adoption of IFRS 3/3R leads to the 
loss of information value for current earnings, whether those “label adopters” who 
make insignificant change in reporting policy will suffer less for such negative side of 
IFRS. But we could not partition out sample into two groups at this stage. Daske et al. 
(2013) concentrate on voluntary IFRS adopters. Thus, it’s applicable for them to divide 
all voluntary IFRS adopters to two groups based on the underlying reporting incentive. 
However, in this study we focus on the mandatory IFRS adoption of IFRS 3 and use the 
uniform cutoff from 2005. This makes insufficient variation in terms of reporting 
incentives across different firms.   
According to La Porta et al. (1998), differences in the nature and effectiveness of 
financial reporting system can be traced in part to the variations in terms of investor 
protections. And protecting investors from expropriation of insider information relies 
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on the legal rules and its enforcement power. They find that common (civil) law system 
has the strongest (weakest) power of investor protection and such difference in respect 
of investor protection will lead variations of investors’ demand of external financial 
reporting. Therefore, we partition our sample into two groups based on law system. The 
first group is countries with civil law (or code law) system and the second group is 
under common law system. The legal system of each EU member country is described 
in Appendix 2. Civil law is codified and countries with civil law system have 
comprehensive, continuously updated legal codes. Common law is uncodified and it is 
largely based on precedent, meaning the judicial decisions that have already been made 
in similar cases. Therefore, civil law system is usually regarded as with stronger 
implementation power than common law system. For the 20 countries observations 
included in our study, only Ireland and the UK are under common law system, all the 
other countries have civil law system. Thus, we conduct subsample test as in Panel A of 
Table 13.  The result shows that countries under civil law system suffer more 
informativeness loss than those under common law system.  
Our explanation for this result could be split into two parts: First of all, the strict 
implementation of IFRS under civil law makes adopters suffer more loss in earnings 
information for future performance. This implies that there is some inherent problem 
associated with IFRS which cost strict adopters the information value of its financial 
reporting. Secondly, the more comprehensive investor protection environment with a 
common law system requires companies disclose as much as information eliminate 
information asymmetry. Such transparent makes investors suffer less of earnings 
information.  
Secondly, Christensen et al. (2013) also attributes the increase in market liquidity to the 
substantive reporting enforcement change in five member countries in EU including 
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Finland, Germany, the Netherland, Norway and the U.K. In this study, we do not 
include companies from Norway though they also adopt IFRS as it’s in the Europe 
Economic Area. Therefore, we exclude observations from Finland, Germany, the 
Netherland and the U.K to see whether our main result is tied with the institutional 
change or purely by the revision of IFRS 3 per se.   
The result in Panel B of Table 13 shows that for those firms adopt IFRS but without 
corresponding change in terms of implementation power, the loss of information value 
for future earnings is consistent with previous result, but such loss turns to be 
insignificant for future cash flows.  This means the revision of IFRS 3 per se will leads 
to deterioration of earnings information value while simultaneous enforcement reform 
reinforce such effect with supervision on implementation status. This result also echoes 
with previous subsample test on civil law versus common law system that stronger 
enforcement environment make IFRS adopters suffer more from the revision of IFRS 3 
in respect of earnings’ information content.  
Thirdly, as mentioned in Chapter 7.2 that Germany and Sweden are two representative 
IFRS adopters both under civil law system. Therefore, we perform a subsample test on 
these two countries separately to see the influence of enforcement power. Panel C of 
Table 13 shows the result of subsample test. We could observe that Germany suffers 
larger loss in respect of earnings informative value. At this stage, we could infer that 
enforcement power has impact on the extent of informativeness loss.  
[INSERT TABLE 13 HERE] 
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9.4 Earnings Components Decomposition   
Following Dechow (1994) and Dechow et al. (1998), we acknowledge that earnings are 
a superior current performance measure and a predictor of future performance. Their 
superiority comes from accruals, which mitigate the timing and matching problems 
embedded in cash flows. As we have evidence demonstrating that earnings reported 
under IFRS 3R cease to contain as much information, we aim to discover the 
underlying causes of this informativeness loss. The role of accruals following the IFRS 
3R adoption is significant.  Sloan (1996) documents the lower persistence of accrual 
components in earnings and the market’s inability to impound the difference in 
persistence between cash flows and accruals. Thus, we decompose earnings into cash 
flows and accruals to determine their separate contributions to earnings’ predictive 
power.  
The modelling process is as followed:  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼𝛼2  𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + Controls + 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  + 
𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (13) 
If we substitute 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  using (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  -𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ), then we could get the following 
equation:  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + (𝛼𝛼2-𝛼𝛼1) 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ Controls + 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  + 
𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃𝜃𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (14) 
Thus, the coefficient of Accrual represents the incremental contributions of accruals to 
earnings informativeness. We therefore choose scaled quarterly earnings (IBQS) and 
accruals (AccrualS) as independent variables where scaled cash flows from operations 
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(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1) and quarterly earnings (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1) from one quarter ahead are the dependent 
variables, respectively.  
Table 14 shows the regression results for the proposed model. We add a time dummy 
and interaction terms between the time dummy and earnings as well as accruals 
respectively to facilitate a comparison between the pre- and post-revision periods.  
Panel A exhibits the forecasting ability of earnings and accruals for future cash flows. 
We find a positive incremental effect in both the pre- and post-revision periods for 
accruals, which is consistent with previous findings that accruals indeed assist earnings 
in better predicting future cash flows. However, in terms of the forecasting power for 
future earnings, Panel B of Table 14 shows that accruals played an ambiguous role by 
improving earnings forecast ability in the pre-revision period but degrading this in the 
post-revision period.  This invites for further studies of how accruals change the role of 
current earnings in predicting future earnings.  
[INSERT TABLE 14 HERE] 
9.5 Annual Test 
Because the capital market effects documented in this study partially stem from the 
changes affecting goodwill recognition and impairment test of goodwill is required to 
be conducted annually.  Thus, we add annual test to see whether the phenomenon of 
earnings informativeness loss exist for annual earnings. Table 15 presents the empirical 
result where the regression variables are defined similarly with quarterly data.  The 
result represents that annual earnings suffer from the same flaw for losing 
informativeness for both future earnings and future cash flows. Though the 
phenomenon is not as significant as quarterly data, as we mentioned before, this may be 
caused by cancelling out effect when a firm repeat M&A transactions within one year. 
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[INSERT TABLE 15 HERE] 
In addition to the preceding robustness test, we perform additional tests by excluding 
voluntary adopters from our sample (removing 83 voluntary adopters and leaving 291 
firm observations), replacing value-weighted market returns with equal weighted 
market returns, using a three-interaction term (e.g., earnings multiply by time dummy 
and loss dummy simultaneously) in the regression and extending the forecast horizon to 
one year ahead. We obtain consistent results, which are untabulated in this paper.  
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Chapter 10 Conclusions and Discussions 
A growing number of studies are focusing on the determinants and consequences of 
mandatory or voluntary IFRS adoption. These studies offer a “benchmark” of the costs 
and benefits of IFRS adoption to both standard setters and public users of financial 
statements. They also have implications for the global financial reporting convergence 
process. However, several recent studies have challenged  the findings of previous 
research by documenting contrary results, including the downward trend of accounting 
quality and the existence of “label” adopters and heterogeneity involved in IFRS 
adoption (Pownall and Wieczyska,2012; H. Daske et al., 2013; Ahmed et al.,2013). The 
recent IFRS findings give rise to a new round of debate, as IFRS has gained 
considerable momentum around the world and is currently widely adopted or permitted 
by jurisdictions and several states (United States, Japan, India, Russia, etc.) are 
considering shifting their domestic accounting standards to IFRS.  
Our study investigates two out of the three general categories of accounting quality 
defined by Dechow et al. (2010), including earnings informativeness as well as 
earnings persistence (properties of earnings) and market efficiency in terms of the 
quarterly earnings surprise process and earnings volatility effect (investor 
responsiveness to earnings).  
In the first phase of this study, we test the deterioration in earnings information content 
related to future firm performance (earnings and cash flows) based on the findings of 
previous studies stating that earnings are a superior predictor per se due to the role of 
accruals (Dechow, 1994; Dechow et al., 1998; Finger, 1994) and their importance in 
the equity valuation process. Our results demonstrate degradation in the predictive 
power of earnings following IFRS 3R adoption. Such a loss of informativeness should 
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attract attention from standard setters to remediate the disconnection between earnings 
and future firm performance. Investors should also consult financial statements with 
caution, as earnings are not as reliable as they once were.  
In addition to this test, we detect an increasing trend in earnings volatility brought on 
by IFRS 3R. Both empirical and survey studies have presented an inverse relation 
between earnings volatility and persistence in terms of annual data (Dichev and Tang, 
2009; Frankel and Litov, 2009; Graham et al., 2005). We successfully extend the 
earnings volatility effect to quarterly earnings following Foster’s model by constructing 
seasonal and momentum components in quarterly earnings. Our results show that 
earnings volatility impairs the autocorrelation of the quarterly earnings surprise. In 
addition, we discover an aggravated earnings volatility effect along with greater 
fluctuating earnings in the period following IFRS 3 revision.  
Finally, in terms of investors’ responsiveness to earnings properties, three types of 
studies have proved the imperfection of the capital market to recognize the lesser 
persistence of accruals, specific properties of earnings components and to timely 
response to the information conveyed by earnings (Sloan, 1996; Burgstahler et al., 2002; 
Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Bartov et al., 2002; Cao and 
Narayanamoorthy, 2011).  Although we do not expect a “strong- form efficient” market, 
our findings imply that the capital market cannot fully impound the quarterly earnings 
process and the earnings volatility effect by reacting in an opposite direction or 
underreact. Under the PEAD context, we find solid evidence that market omits 
quarterly earnings process and the increased earnings volatility effect on this process. 
And a comparison of the pre- and post-revision periods reveals that capital market 
could gradually realize the quarterly earnings process to some extent but it still 
59 
 
underestimates the aggregated negative effect of earnings volatility on such process 
along with the adoption of IFRS 3R.  
This study may explain the reluctance of firms to “seriously” adopt IFRS by shedding 
light on a single IFRS standard. Our evidence shows that stronger enforcement power 
or stricter legal system may lead to more serious informativenss loss. And this loss 
could be attributed to IFRS 3 with confidence as we rule out other IFRS standards by 
testing other EU listed firms with no M&A transaction ever. We also provide some 
caveats for those dependent on financial statements. They should no longer solely rely 
on earnings as a source of information when a firm is involved in M&A transactions 
and adopting IFRS in its financial reports.  
However, our research subjects to several limitations: First of all, several changes 
brought by the new IFRS 3 come from wider use of fair value measurement. The 
reliability of fair value measurement including intangible assets, contingent 
considerations and the previously acquired assets depends on the existence of active 
market in the target company country. However, in this study our sample include firm-
level observations only therefore we could not partition the sample based on the 
country of the target company because one acquirer usually involve in sequential M&A 
transactions and the target companies may include both developed and developing 
country. The same problem occurs when we consider to conducting subsample test 
based types of M&A transaction (one-step acquisition, step or partial acquisition).  
Secondly, as documented by Dechow et al. (2010), earnings persistence depends on a 
firm’s fundamental performance and accounting measurement systems. Because it is 
difficult to disentangle the roles of each, we cannot conclude that the less persistent 
earnings stem solely from a firm’s fundamental performance. Similar to the investors’ 
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responsiveness criteria used in our study, although we link earnings to the usefulness of 
decisions, our inferences may be biased by omitted correlated variables that affect 
investor reactions.  In addition, using a uniform cutoff (before and after July 2009) 
prevents us from exclusively ruling out the effect of economic shocks, regulatory 
change and enforcement reform that occurred simultaneously.  It is also important to 
note that the Mishkin test is also controversial, as Kothari, Sabino and Zach (2005) 
argue that its results are sensitive to survivorship biases and truncation errors and Kraft, 
Leone and Wasley (2007) deny its superiority to the OLS method.  
Further research could elaborate more on the loss of earnings informativeness and its 
consequences within a bigger picture. For example, auditors’ response and analysts 
forecast accuracy should be considered as earnings are no longer as informative as they 
were. In addition, there is possibility to dig deeper for the reasons for earnings 
informativeness loss by testing firms’ characteristics and determine which factor makes 
earnings suffer more from informativeness loss.  
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics 
14 IBQ, CFO and ACCRUAL are all in the unit of million dollars.  And IBQS and CFOS are scaled IBQ and CFO 
respectively by  the moving average of total assets following Atwood et al. (2011).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
15 We present the frequencies of M&A transactions for the pre- and post-revision period separately in Figure 2.  
16 There are 4,826 M&A transactions from 2005 to 2012 in total, but only 3,235 out of them have transactions details 
available. 
Panel A:  Firm-quarter Observations 
 Full Sample Pre Post Difference 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Mean Mean  
IBQ14 12,721 257.729 3731.687 295.713 217.171 -78.54 
IBQS 12,721 0.0106 0.0643 0.0120 0.0091 -0.0029 *** 
Accrual 10,025 359.505 8663.596 250.888 462.075  211.187 
CFO 10,025 -49.736 8459.677 128.50  -218.05 -346.56**  
CFOS  10,025 -0.0012 0. 0651 0.00029 -0.0026 -0.0029** 
SUE 12,100 -14.164   4123.239   -36.530    7.533 44.063 
DSUE 12,100   0.0002 0.3179 -0.0282   0.01246 0.0249 *** 
EVOL 12,843 3.7884   61.7257 2.8356    4.7576 1.9221 ** 
DEVOL 12,843 -0.00054 0.31969 -0.02804 0.02760 0.05581*** 
Return  12,705 0.0552 2.0413 0.01523 0.09772 0.08248** 
Mktreturn 12,705 0.0196 0.0892 -0.00350 0.04427 0.04776*** 
Abreturn 12,705 0.0355 2.0425 0.01873 0.05345 0.03554 
ATQ  12,465 22896.24 201237.40 18537.10 27500.60 8963.50*** 
AT 12,465 21428.63 184272.20 16941.07   26168.62   9227.55*** 
MVE 12.705 14025.26 113947.80 14543.54 13473.20 -1070.34 
Size  12,705 0.0052 0.3185 0.01005 0.00011 -0.00994** 
Loss  12.705 0.1751 0.3801  0.16237 0.18872 0.02635*** 
It 12,705 0.2313 0.4217 0.22188 0.24138 0.01950*** 
Panel B: Firm Observations  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 10th Pctl. 50th Pctl. 90thPctl. 
P1_no  374 10.97 11.39 2 7 23 
P2_no15 374 1.88 1.72   1 1 4 
Incsmooth  371 0.068 0.441 -0.555 0.118   0.651  
Panel C: M&A Transaction Details16 
 One-step 
Acquisition 
Step 
Acquisition 
Partial Acquisition Total 
Period 1 1,315(66.35%) 82(4.14%) 324(16.35%) 1,982 
Period 2 815(65.04%) 32(2.55%) 196(15.64%) 1,253 
Total 2,130(65.84%) 114(3.52%) 520(16.07%) 3,235 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Distribution by Country and Industry 
Panel A: Sample Country Distribution 
Country  Frequency  Percentage  Accu.Percent  
AS (Austria) 396  2.94 2.94 
BL (Belgium) 144 1.07 4.01 
CC (Czech Republic) 36 0.27 4.28 
DN (Denmark) 648 4.81 9.09 
EA (Estonia) 72 0.53 9.63 
FN (Finland) 972         7.22 16.84 
FR (France) 2,988        22.19 39.04 
GR (Greece) 216         1.60 40.64 
HU (Hungary) 36   0.27 40.91 
IR (Ireland) 252   1.87 42.78 
IT (Italy) 792         5.88 48.66 
LV (Slovenia) 36 0.27 48.93 
LX (Luxembourg) 36 0.27 49.20 
NT (Netherlands) 576   4.28 53.48 
PL (Poland) 504   3.74 57.22 
PO (Portugal) 72 0.53 57.75 
SP (Spain) 648   4.81 62.57 
SW (Sweden) 1,476      10.96 73.53 
UK (United Kingdom) 972         7.22 80.75 
WG (Germany) 2,592        19.25 100.00 
Total  13,464 100.00 100.00 
Panel B: Sample Industry Distribution 
Industry  Frequency  Percentage  Accu.Percent  
1 CPS 1,368        10.16        10.16 
2 ENERGY 1,152         8.56        18.72 
3 HEALTH 1,188         8.82        27.54 
4 HT   2,556        18.98        46.52 
5 IND 2,556        18.98      65.51 
6 MATERLS 1,332         9.89        75.40 
7 MEDIA 1,188         8.82        84.22 
8 MATERLS 612   4.55        88.77 
9 STAPLES 1,008         7.49        96.26 
10 TELECOM 504 3.74       100.00 
Total  13,464 100.00 100.00 
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TABLE 3 
 SUE Persistence and Abnormal-return-based Case  
Panel A:  DSUE (Dependent Variable 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘) 
 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
Full sample     
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                               
(1)            0.390*** 0.194*** 0.054*** -0.216*** 
                                                     (39.13) (18.14) (4.87) (-19.57) 
(2) 0.400*** 0.230*** 0.090*** -0.170*** 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.152*** 0.037*** 0.003*** 0.045*** 
 (2114.07) (442.06) (31.91) (509.11) 
N 11789 11408 11041 10698 
Highest Earnings Volatility Quintile    
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 0.311*** 0.129*** 0.005 -0.283*** 
 (16.55) (6.51) (0.23) (-14.24) 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.102*** 0.017*** -0.0004 0.085*** 
 (273.75) (42.36) (0.05) (202.71) 
N 2413 2335 2258 2176 
Lowest Earnings Volatility Quintile 
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 0.472*** 0.228*** 0.104*** -0.153*** 
 (23.57) (9.98) (4.36) (-6.32) 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.200*** 0.044*** 0.009*** 0.019*** 
 (555.72) (99.70) (19.01) (39.94) 
N 2213 2142 2068 2008 
Panel B: Quarter-Long Abnormal Returns (Dependent Variable 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘)  
 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 0.1500*** 0.0105 0.1390 0.1360 
 (4.62) (0.12) (1.46) (1.44) 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.0004** -0.0001 0.0003** 0.0003** 
 (6.45) (0.03) (4.99) (4.92) 
N 12215 11961 11602 11235 
 ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,  *p<0.10.  
(1) Coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) are from Fama-Macbeth regressions with 
Newey-West standard errors, which are robust to autocorrelation and hetetoskedasticity.  
(2) Coefficient from Rangan and Sloan (1998)  
SUE is the difference between the current quarter’s earnings and the earnings of the 
corresponding quarter in the previous year. 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is the scaled decile rank for each quarter 
transformed by dividing by 9 and then subtracting 0.5. Thus, 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is ranging from -0.5 and 
+0.5. 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return(raw return adjusted for the CRSP 
value-weighted index return), calculated from the first day of each calendar quarter and ending 
one day before next calendar quarter. 
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TABLE 4 
Quarterly Earnings Volatility and Earnings Persistence 
Panel A: Foster Model  
(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 -𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3)=α + β (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 -𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−4) +𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1=α + β𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
Quintiles by 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 β (Persistence) t-statistics 𝑅𝑅2 Adj 𝑅𝑅2 
Volatility Q1(low) 0.472*** 23.57 0.2009 0.2005 
Volatility Q2 0.472*** 25.52 0.2153 0.2150 
Volatility Q3 0.434*** 23.55 0.1891 0.1887 
Volatility Q4 0.344*** 18.02 0.1190 0.1187 
Volatility Q5(High) 0.311*** 16.55 0.1020 0.1016 
Difference (Q1-Q5) 0.131***    
P-value on 
difference  
<0.001    
Panel B: AR(1) Model  
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1=α + θ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 +𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
Quintiles by 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 θ (Persistence) t-statistics 𝑅𝑅2 Adj 𝑅𝑅2 
Volatility Q1(low) 0.762*** 53.86 0.5403 0.5401 
Volatility Q2 0.658*** 42.31 0.4197 0.4195 
Volatility Q3 0.634*** 40.95 0.4054 0.4052 
Volatility Q4 0.532*** 31.17 0.2831 0.2828 
Volatility Q5(High) 0.514*** 31.53 0.2877 0.2874 
Difference (Q1-Q5) 0.248***    
P-value on 
difference  
<0.001    
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 is the decile rank of earnings before extraordinary items in quarter t deflated by average 
total assets. SUE is the difference between the current quarter’s earnings and the earnings of the 
corresponding quarter in the previous year. 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the scaled decile rank for each quarter 
transformed by dividing by 9 and then subtracting 0.5. Thus, 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is ranging from -0.5 and 
+0.5. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 is the variance of earnings for the latest eight quarters till quarter t, scaled by 
moving average of total assets over the same period.   
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TABLE 5 
Earnings informativeness for future cash flow and earnings 
Panel A: Current Earnings and Future Cash Flows (Dependent Variable: CFOS_1) 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3Profit) Model 4(Loss) Model 5(2 quarters) 
IBQS 0.207*** 0.392*** 0.477*** 0.0775 0.380*** 
 (2.99) (6.84) (4.88) (0.84) (8.71) 
POST -0.0004 0.0005 -0.00060 0.0023 -0.0059* 
 (-0.13) (0.16) (-0.17) (0.27) (-2.58) 
IBQS*POST  -0.243*** -0.231* -0.0713 -0.174 
  (-2.80) (-1.84) (-0.70) (-1.42) 
Gdp_growth -0.0031 -0.0030 -0.0053*** 0.0123 0.0005 
 (-1.28) (-1.20) (-2.86) (1.41) (0.31) 
Inflation 0.0105** 0.0112** 0.0083 0.0376* 0.0009 
 (2.34) (2.45) (1.43) (1.74) (0.19) 
Pop_growth 0.0628** 0.0590** 0.0521 0.215** 0.0272 
 (2.27) (2.12) (1.58) (2.28) (1.15) 
Tax -0.0069 -0.0066 -0.0056 -0.0344 -0.0037 
 (-0.91) (-0.85) (-0.73) (-1.05) (-0.65) 
Size 0.0132*** 0.0130*** 0.00052* 0.0375*** 0.0126*** 
 (4.46) (4.44) (1.81) (3.73) (5.58) 
Incsmooth -0.0032** -0.00343** -0.0026* -0.0098* -0.0030*** 
 (-2.28) (-2.36) (-1.93) (-1.92) (-3.14) 
Intercept  0.093 0.082 0.067 0.438 0.061 
 (0.66) (0.57) (0.50) (0.68) (0.56) 
N 9719 9719 8103 1616 9046 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.023 0.027 0.026 0.033 0.076 
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Panel B: Current Earnings and Future Earnings (Dependent Variable: IBQS_1) 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3Profit) Model 4(Loss) Model 5(2 quarters) 
IBQS -0.099 0.374*** 0.347*** 0.274*** 0.304** 
 (-0.52) (5.17) (5.27) (2.08) (7.48) 
POST 0.009 0.0114* 0.017** -0.0058 0.0103*** 
 (1.49) (1.93) (2.39) (-0.79) (2.58) 
IBQS*POST  -0.577*** -0.612*** -0.458*** -0.427** 
  (-2.83) (-2.23) (-2.64) (-6.62) 
Gdp_growth -0.000004 0.0008 0.0007 0.0001 0.0007 
 (0.00) (0.12) (1.12) (0.05) (1.09) 
Inflation -0.00004 0.0022 -0.0004 0.0234*** 0.0016 
 (-0.02) (1.00) (-0.22) (3.98) (0.83) 
Pop_growth 0.0260*** 0.0152* 0.0087 0.117*** 0.0137* 
 (2.77) (1.80) (1.03) (2.66) (1.82) 
Tax -0.00003 0.0017 0.0041 -0.0062 0.0038* 
 (-0.01) (0.54) (1.33) (-0.58) (1.86) 
Size 0.0120*** 0.0092*** 0.0021 0.0215*** 0.0008*** 
 (2.74) (2.80) (0.82) (4.04) (4.60) 
Incsmooth -0.0022** -0.0023** -0.0003 -0.00717* -0.0020**** 
 (-2.14) (-2.26) (-0.51) (-1.84) (-2.90) 
Intercept  0.0126 -0.0275 -0.0627 -0.0007 -0.0649* 
 (0.18) (-0.48) (-1.12) (0.00) (-1.68) 
N 12214 12214 10090 2124 11824 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.018 0.068 0.064 0.080 0.090 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
Note: We include country, industry and firm year fixed effect in both sets of regression but not report them for brevity. 
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TABLE 6 
Earnings Volatility Change 
 
EVOL DEVOL 
POST 1.872* 1.753** 0.061*** 0.059*** 
  (1.72) (2.36) (13.10) (13.97) 
Incsmooth -2.274*** 0.479*** -0.0127** -0.0062 
  (-3.68) (2.83) (-2.31) (-1.22) 
Size  17.71*** 2.351*** 0.577*** 0.544*** 
  (5.66) (10.22) (80.26) (67.03) 
Gdp_growth 1.090*** -9.252 0.0158*** -0.0018 
  (4.26) (-1.34) (7.69) (-0.25) 
Inflation 16.60*** 23.05 0.0247*** -0.0034 
  (4.60) (1.59) (6.69) (-0.22) 
Pop_growth -20.02*** 11.32 0.032*** -0.035 
  (-4.60) (0.31) (2.69) (-0.85) 
Tax 0.571*** -74.21** -0.0005 0.0097** 
  (4.38) (-2.18) (-0.99) (0.48) 
Intercept  -36.95*** 1314.1** -0.0857*** -0.185 
 (-4.42) (2.15) (-7.62) (-0.50) 
Country FE      NO     YES     NO     YES 
Industry FE      NO     YES     NO     YES 
N     12523    12523     12523     12523 
Adj 𝑅𝑅2 0.051 0.540 0.340 0.447 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
EVOL is the variance of earnings for the latest eight quarters till quarter t, scaled by moving 
average of total assets over the same period.  DEVOL is the decile ranking of EVOL, 
transformed with a range from -0.5 to + 0.5.  Incsmooth is the correlation of a firm’s change in 
discretionary accruals with its change in pre-managed earnings. Size is the decile rank of the 
market value at the end of the previous quarter, ranging from -0.5 to +0.5 after transformation. 
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TABLE 7 
 Earnings Volatility Effect  
Panel A: Earnings Volatility Effect on Seasonal Difference Earnings Autocorrelation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
DSUE 0.381*** 0.354*** 0.385*** 0.373*** 0.412*** 0.417*** 
  (37.43) (34.36) (37.14) (32.25) (34.49) (34.37) 
DEVOL -0.0024   0.0235* 0.0002 -0.004 0.0224* 
  (-0.234)   (1.85) (0.02) (-0.39) (1.76) 
DSUE* 
DEVOL 
-0.212*** -0.239*** -0.215*** -0.207*** -0.237*** 
(-6.62)   (-5.50) (-6.63) (-6.48) (-5.46) 
SIZE -0.041*** -0.052***     -0.051*** 
    (-3.97) (-4.10)     (-4.02) 
DSUE* 
SIZE 
-0.092*** 0.049     0.053 
  (-2.91) (1.15)     (1.25) 
LOSS       -0.0153    
        (-1.52)    
DSUE* 
LOSS 
      0.0075    
      (0.27)    
It         -0.0009  -0.0009 
         (-0.14) (-0.15) 
DSUE* 
It 
        -0.116*** -0.115*** 
        (-5.33) (-5.31) 
Gdp_ 
growth 
-0.025*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
(-2.99) (-2.89) (-2.94) (-2.97) (-2.96) (-2.91) 
Inflation 0.0414 0.0391 0.0388 0.0426 0.043 0.041 
 (1.565) (1.50) (1.46) (1.61) (1.62) (1.52) 
Pop_ 
growth 
0.0874 0.0857 0.0811 0.0885 0.0931 0.0868 
(0.95) (0.94) (0.89) (0.96) (0.99) (0.94) 
Tax -0.000009 -0.0018 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0018 
  (0.00) (-0.04) (-0.02) (0.00) (-0.02) (-0.04) 
Incsmoo
th 
-0.00395 -0.0041 -0.0040 -0.0035 -0.0042 -0.0042 
(-0.62) (-0.65) (-0.62) (-0.55) (-0.66) (-0.66) 
Intercep
t  
-0.0126 0.0379 0.0061 -0.0169 -0.017 0.003 
(-0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (-0.02) (-0.02) (0.00) 
Fixed 
Effect* YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 11580 11580 11580 11580 11580 11580 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.174 0.172 0.176 0.175 0.177 0.178 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
* We include country, industry and firm year fixed effects in the regression but not report it for 
brevity.  
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Panel B: Longer Forecast Horizon for Earnings Volatility Effect  
  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
DSUE 0.280*** 0.260*** 0.286*** 0.280*** 0.296*** 0.302*** 
  (32.12) (30.18) (32.18) (28.43) (29.26) (29.29) 
DEVOL 0.0029   0.039*** 0.0026 0.0028 0.0385*** 
  (0.34)   (3.66) (0.29) (0.32) (3.62) 
DSUE*
DEVOL 
-0.163*** -0.198*** -0.161*** -0.158*** -0.197*** 
(-6.01)   (-5.50) (-5.84) (-5.80) (-5.48) 
Size    -0.048*** -0.069***     -0.069*** 
    (-5.50) (-6.47)     (-6.43) 
DSUE*
Size  
  -0.0495* 0.0673*     0.0695** 
  (-1.87) (1.93)     (1.99) 
Loss        0.0027     
        (0.32)     
DSUE*
Loss 
      0.0039     
      (0.17)     
It         -0.0057 -0.0058 
          (-1.05) (-1.06) 
DSUE* 
It 
        -0.057*** -0.056*** 
        (-3.06) (-3.02) 
Gdp_ 
growth 
-0.0116 -0.0111 -0.0113 -0.0116 -0.0118 -0.0115 
(-1.53) (-1.41) (-1.49) (-1.53) (-1.53) (-1.49) 
Inflation 0.0535** 0.0508** 0.0503** 0.0533** 0.0551** 0.0519** 
  (2.11) (2.00) (1.99) (2.10) (2.16) (2.05) 
Pop_ 
growth 
0.0331 0.0294 0.0266 0.0328 0.0372 0.0307 
(0.41) (0.37) (0.34) (0.41) (0.45) (0.38) 
Tax 0.0192 0.0177 0.0175 0.0192 0.0185 0.0167 
  (0.48) (0.43) (0.44) (0.48) (0.46) (0.41) 
Incsmoo
th 
-0.0049 -0.0051 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.005 -0.0051 
(-0.90) (-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-0.94) 
Intercep
t  
-0.377 -0.334 -0.345 -0.376 -0.375 -0.341 
(-0.49) (-0.42) (-0.45) (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.44) 
Fixed 
Effect* YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 11158 11158 11158 11158 11158 11158 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.168 0.168 0.172 0.168 0.169 0.173 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
* We include country, industry and firm year fixed effects in the regression but not report it for 
brevity.  
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TABLE 8 
Earnings Volatility Pre- and Post- Comparison 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
  Pre Post Pre Post 
DSUE 0.410*** 0.354*** 0.417*** 0.376*** 
  (28.56) (24.76) (28.35) (26.60) 
EVOL 0.0002* 0.00034***   
  (1.94) (3.34)   
DSUE * EVOL -0.0002 -0.00052***   
  (-1.57) (-4.03)   
DEVOL   -0.0517*** 0.0808*** 
    (-2.75) (4.61) 
DSUE*DEVOL   -0.178*** -0.248*** 
    (-3.82) (-5.57) 
Diff: Post -Pre  -0.00032***  -0.07*** 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖2  (18.85)  (45.95) 
Gdp_growth -0.0196** 0.0205 -0.0221* 0.018 
  (-2.05) (1.30) (-2.18) (1.14) 
Inflation 0.0087 0.0071 0.0135 0.0098 
  (0.30) (0.23) (0.46) (0.31) 
Pop_growth 0.0936 0.0616 0.0835 0.0207 
  (1.00) (0.22) (0.93) (0.08) 
Tax 0.0243 -0.0025 0.0145 -0.0009 
  (0.51) (-0.20) (0.31) (-0.07) 
Incsmooth -0.0064 -0.0006 -0.0067 -0.0016 
  (-0.72) (-0.06) (-0.76) (-0.17) 
Size -0.0444*** -0.0410*** -0.0133 -0.0765*** 
  (-3.11) (-2.77) (-0.71) (-4.35) 
Intercept  -0.530 0.047 -0.356 0.027 
 (-0.60) (0.77) (-0.41) (0.45) 
Fixed Effect * YES YES YES YES 
N 5869 5711 5869 5711 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.171 0.141 0.174 0.148 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
*We include country and industry fixed effect in the regression but not repot it for brevity.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
71 
 
TABLE 9 
Mishkin Test of Market Efficiency for Earnings Volatility Effect 
We estimate coefficients simultaneously of the two following equations using the 
simultaneous nonlinear procedure proposed by Mishkin [1983]: 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1        = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑏𝑏0 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐼𝐼0 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑0 (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 * 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) +𝑔𝑔0 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ℎ0(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  ∗  𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1  (10) 
𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0-𝛽𝛽0𝑎𝑎0∗  +𝛽𝛽0𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 -𝛽𝛽0𝑏𝑏0∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 - 𝛽𝛽0𝐼𝐼0∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 - 𝛽𝛽0𝑑𝑑0∗ (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 * 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) - 𝛽𝛽0𝑔𝑔0∗𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 -𝛽𝛽0ℎ0∗(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  ∗  𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) 
+ µ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
 
 
(12) 
Parameter Full Sample Pre Post 
𝑏𝑏0 0.35741*** 0.36577*** 0.32735 *** 
 (34.79) (24.78) (22.70) 
𝑏𝑏0
∗ -0.33557 -1.00539* -0.17991 
 (-1.01) (-1.90) (-0.63) 
𝑑𝑑0 -0.00031 *** -0.00016  -0.00046*** 
 (-3.20) (-1.32) (-3.54) 
𝑑𝑑0
∗  -0.00095 *** -0.00066 -0.0011** 
 (-2.73) (-0.96) (-2.58) 
𝛽𝛽0 0.17241 ** 0.08167* 0.25004** 
 (2.53) (1.79) (1.97) 
Chi-square to Test Market Efficiency Constraints * 
𝑏𝑏0 = 𝑏𝑏0∗ & 𝑑𝑑0 = 𝑑𝑑0∗ 5.38* 8.68** 3.81 
𝑏𝑏0 = 𝑏𝑏0∗ 4.33** 6.70*** 3.15* 
𝑑𝑑0 = 𝑑𝑑0∗  3.91** 0.49 2.90* 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
*A significant chi-square value implies that the real coefficient in Equation 10 and the inferred 
coefficient in Equation 12 are significantly different.  
SUE is the difference between the current quarter’s earnings and the earnings of the 
corresponding quarter in the previous year. 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the scaled decile rank for each quarter 
transformed by dividing by 9 and then subtracting 0.5. Thus, 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is ranging from -0.5 and 
+0.5. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the variance of earnings for the latest eight quarters till quarter t, scaled by 
moving average of total assets over the same period.  𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the market-adjusted buy-
and-hold return(raw return adjusted for the CRSP value-weighted index return), calculated 
from the first day of each calendar quarter and ending one day before next calendar quarter. 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the decile rank of the market value at the end of the previous quarter, ranging from -
0.5 to +0.5 after transformation. 
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TABLE 10 
Earnings Informativeness of Other EU listed firms 
Panel A: Earnings Informativeness for Future Cash Flows  
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3(Profit) Model 4(Loss) 
IBQS 0.468*** 0.385*** 0.425*** 0.234 
  (6.35) (3.99) (5.08) (1.44) 
Post -0.0146*** -0.0141*** -0.0151*** -0.0072 
  (-4.44) (-4.30) (-3.44) (-1.04) 
IBQS*Post   0.257** 0.157 0.404** 
    (2.53) (1.40) (2.48) 
Size 0.0123*** 0.0112*** 0.0070** 0.0125** 
  (3.65) (3.59) (2.08) (1.99) 
Incsmooth -0.0077*** -0.0071*** -0.0005 -0.0122*** 
  (-3.37) (-3.30) (-0.19) (-3.77) 
Fixed Effect* YES YES YES YES 
N 13564 13564 8616 4948 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.085 0.089 0.037 0.094 
Panel B: Earnings Informativeness for Future Earnings 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3(Profit) Model 4(Loss) 
IBQS 0.406*** 0.364*** 0.406*** 0.260*** 
  (4.63) (3.80) (8.55) (2.76) 
Post -0.0024* -0.0019 -0.0021 0.0041 
  (-1.67) (-1.32) (-1.08) (1.03) 
IBQS*Post   0.185* -0.018 0.271** 
   (1.84) (-0.21) (2.46) 
Size 0.0214*** 0.0203*** 0.0125*** 0.0204*** 
  (6.05) (7.21) (9.42) (4.53) 
Incsmooth -0.0078*** -0.0070*** -0.0017 -0.0090*** 
  (-4.15) (-4.41) (-1.24) (-3.55) 
Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
N 16809 16809 10574 6235 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.205 0.210 0.185 0.154 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
* We include Economic Controls including GDP growth, inflation rate, population growth and 
the ratio of tax revenue over GDP as well as country, industry and firm year fixed effects but do 
not report them for brevity.  
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TABLE 11 
 Earnings Volatility Change for Other EU Listed Firms 
 
 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
*Fixed Effects include country and industry fixed effect in this regression.  
EVOL is the variance of earnings for the latest eight quarters till quarter t, scaled by moving 
average of total assets over the same period.  DEVOL is the decile ranking of EVOL, 
transformed with a range from -0.5 to + 0.5.  Incsmooth is the correlation of a firm’s change in 
discretionary accruals with its change in pre-managed earnings. Size is the decile rank of the 
market value at the end of the previous quarter, ranging from -0.5 to +0.5 after transformation. 
 
 
  EVOL DEVOL 
Post 0.0041 -0.0148 0.0287*** 0.0078 
  (0.19) (-0.31) (6.63) (0.78) 
Incsmooth 0.0486 -0.0218 0.0889*** 0.0679*** 
  (1.59) (-0.91) (17.64) (13.17) 
Size 1.087*** 0.546*** 0.507*** 0.397*** 
  (22.77) (16.46) (78.96) (55.04) 
Gdp_growth -0.0168*** -0.0023 -0.0058*** -0.0049*** 
  (-4.42) (-0.41) (-9.88) (-5.81) 
Inflation 0.139*** 0.0741*** 0.00975*** 0.00162 
  (9.89) (4.29) (7.36) (0.80) 
Pop_growth -0.404*** -0.170*** -0.099*** -0.076*** 
  (-11.61) (-3.51) (-18.51) (-7.81) 
Tax 0.0179*** -0.0074*** 0.0023*** 0.0008 
  (9.55) (-3.51) (6.38) (1.18) 
Intercept -0.1939*** 0.1361** 0.0393*** -0.0015 
 (-4.32) (2.45) (4.48) (-0.06) 
Fixed Effect* NO YES NO YES 
N 17300 17300 17300 17300 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.087 0.475 0.268 0.368 
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TABLE 12 
Financial Tsunami Sensitivity Test 
Panel A: Earnings Informativeness for Firms’ Future Performance 
 
IBQS_1 CFOS_1 
IBQS 0.403*** 0.392*** 0.459*** 0.439*** 
  (4.28) (4.11) (6.15) (5.86) 
POST 0.00291 -0.00143 0.00219 -0.0120 
  (1.32) (-0.30) (1.06) (-0.48) 
IBQS*POST -0.692*** -0.683*** -0.282*** -0.270** 
  (-3.95) (-3.92) (-2.64) (-2.58) 
Size 0.0091*** 0.0124*** 0.00927*** 0.0138*** 
  (3.62) (4.87) (3.30) (3.97) 
Incsmooth -0.00184 -0.00279** -0.00358** -0.00406** 
  (-1.63) (-2.29) (-2.13) (-2.41) 
Gdp_growth 0.00234*** 0.00023 0.00068 -0.00312 
  (4.13) (0.30) (0.71) (-1.14) 
Inflation 0.00073 0.00243 -0.00209 0.0109** 
  (0.67) (1.10) (-1.24) (2.36) 
Pop_growth -0.0085*** 0.0154** -0.00363 0.0572** 
  (-3.13) (1.96) (-0.75) (2.02) 
Tax 0.0001** 0.0017 0.00021 -0.00638 
  (1.15) (0.52) (1.22) (-0.81) 
Intercept 0.0088*** -0.0280 -0.00476 0.0777 
 
(2.69) (-0.46) (-1.06) (0.53) 
Fixed Effect* NO YES NO YES 
N 9266 9266 7328 7328 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.155 0.157 0.026 0.029 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
*Fixed Effects include country, industry and firm year fixed effect in this regression 
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Panel B: Earnings Volatility Trends  
 
EVOL DEVOL 
POST 2.324*** 1.567 0.079*** 0.400** 
 
(2.91) (0.68) (14.85) (2.39) 
Size 13.95*** 2.029*** 0.570*** 0.532*** 
 
(5.24) (8.13) (68.86) (56.87) 
Incsmooth -1.594*** 0.527*** -0.0132** -0.0056 
 
(-3.04) (2.96) (-2.08) (-0.95) 
Gdp_growth 0.808*** -6.364 0.0124*** -0.0003 
 
(3.64) (-1.33) (5.21) (-0.05) 
Inflation 12.13*** 15.59 0.0226*** -0.0147 
 
(4.04) (1.55) (5.34) (-0.95) 
Pop_growth -15.44*** 9.424 0.0252*** -0.0252 
 
(-4.16) (0.37) (1.88) (-0.55) 
Tax 0.428*** -50.38* -0.00086 0.0216 
 
(3.86) (-2.12) (-1.49) (1.16) 
Intercept -27.16*** 891.1** -0.0967*** -0.426 
 
(-3.79) (2.10) (-7.48) (-1.22) 
Fixed Effect* NO YES NO YES 
N 9568 9568 9568 9568 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.052 0.547 0.336 0.446 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
*Fixed Effects include country, industry and firm year fixed effect in this regression.
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Panel C: Earnings Volatility Effect on SUE Autocorrelation 
  DSUE_1 DSUE_1 DSUE_1 DSUE_1 DSUE_1 DSUE_1 
DSUE 0.358*** 0.325*** 0.358*** 0.356*** 0.382*** 0.382*** 
  (34.23) (31.44) (31.30) (29.42) (31.83) (29.59) 
DEVOL 0.0011   0.0264*** 0.0028 0.0004 0.0248* 
  (0.10)   (2.02) (0.25) (0.03) (1.69) 
DSUE * 
DEVOL 
-0.267***   -0.276*** -0.265*** -0.265*** -0.278*** 
(-8.29)   (-6.89) (-8.16) (-8.26) (-6.94) 
Size -0.039*** -0.0502*** -0.0488*** 
   (-3.33) (-3.72)   (-3.62) 
Dsue*Size 0.134*** 0.0235     0.0282 
    (-4.29) (0.61)     (0.73) 
Loss       -0.0116     
        (-1.20)     
Dsue*Loss       -0.0099     
        (-0.39)     
It         -0.0118* -0.0117 
          (-1.62) (-1.61) 
Dsue*It       -0.0942*** -0.0927*** 
          (-4.21) (-4.14) 
Gdp_growth -0.0238** -0.0231* -0.0233** -0.0238** -0.024** -0.0236* 
  (-2.01) (-1.95) (-1.97) (-2.01) (-2.03) (-2.00) 
Inflation 0.0370 0.0349 0.0344 0.0379 0.0396 0.0371 
  (1.08) (1.01) (1.00) (1.10) (1.15) (1.08) 
Pop_growth 0.081 0.0796 0.0754 0.0816 0.0875 0.0820 
  (0.75) (0.73) (0.70) (0.75) (0.81) (0.76) 
Tax 0.0077 0.0594 0.0070 0.0080 0.0066 0.0059 
  (0.17) (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.13) 
Incsmooth -0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0042 -0.0039 -0.0044 -0.0044 
  (-0.58) (-0.55) (-0.58) (-0.54) (-0.61) (-0.62) 
Intercept -0.119 -0.064 -0.106 -0.126 -0.117 -0.103 
  (-0.13) (-0.55) (-0.12) (-0.14) (-0.13) (-0.12) 
 Fixed 
Effect* YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 8644 8644 8644 8644 8644 8644 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.155 0.151 0.156 0.155 0.157 0.158 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
*Fixed Effects include country, industry and firm year fixed effect in this regression 
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TABLE 13 
The Impact of Enforcement Environment 
Panel A: Civil Law versus Common Law System 
 Civil Law Common Law 
  IBQS_1 CFOS_1 IBQS_1 CFOS_1 
IBQS 0.362*** 0.365*** 0.560*** 0.581*** 
  (4.83) (5.95) (7.40) (4.92) 
POST 0.0117* 0.00152 0.00240 -0.0145* 
  (1.83) (0.41) (0.93) (-1.69) 
IBQS *POST -0.571*** -0.225** -0.0665 -0.0205 
  (-2.79) (-2.54) (-0.39) (-0.08) 
Size 0.00905*** 0.0133*** 0.0115*** 0.00626 
  (2.59) (4.27) (3.28) (0.79) 
Incsmooth -0.00179* -0.00357** -0.00627** -0.00546 
  (-1.71) (-2.38) (-2.56) (-1.02) 
Gdp_growth -0.000118 -0.00252 0.00276 -0.0166 
  (-0.15) (-0.95) (1.23) (-1.32) 
Inflation 0.00495** 0.00799 -0.00520** 0.0248* 
  (1.97) (1.56) (-2.49) (1.89) 
Pop_growth 0.0124 0.0251 0.0127*** 0.0671*** 
  (0.64) (0.70) (3.75) (4.30) 
Tax 0.00356 0.000363 0.00216 -0.0425** 
  (0.91) (0.04) (0.67) (-2.20) 
_cons -0.0756 -0.0399 -0.0183 0.908** 
  (-1.03) (-0.24) (-0.26) (2.15) 
Fixed Effect* YES YES YES YES 
N 11284 8979 1031 791 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.066 0.020 0.410 0.186 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
*Fixed Effects include country, industry and firm year fixed effect in this regression 
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Panel B: Countries with No Substantive Enforcement Change 
 
IBQS_1 IBQS_1 CFOS_1 CFOS_1 
IBQS 0.372*** 0.348*** 0.426*** 0.413*** 
  (5.47) (5.32) (5.95) (5.45) 
POST 0.0048** 0.0159* 0.00009 -0.00076 
  (2.35) (1.73) (0.04) (-0.18) 
IBQS*POST -0.621*** -0.604*** -0.098 -0.134 
  (-2.77) (-2.78) (-0.85) (-1.31) 
Size 0.0079* 0.0095* 0.0079** 0.0112** 
  (1.73) (1.69) (2.21) (2.47) 
Incsmooth -0.0025* -0.0036** -0.0033* -0.0047** 
  (-1.93) (-2.47) (-1.72) (-2.40) 
Gdp_growth 0.00323*** 0.00055 0.00098 -0.0019 
  (3.90) (0.53) (1.00) (-0.63) 
Inflation 0.00065 0.00261 -0.00172 0.0117*** 
  (0.44) (1.06) (-1.01) (2.72) 
Pop_growth -0.0167*** 0.0165* -0.00520 0.0604** 
  (-3.51) (1.91) (-0.85) (2.38) 
Tax -0.00005 0.00337* 0.00013 -0.0128* 
  (-0.67) (1.91) (0.88) (-1.79) 
Intercept 0.0146*** -0.0606* -0.0016 0.289** 
  (4.00) (-1.74) (-0.31) (2.23) 
 Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES 
N 7717 7717 6047 6047 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.079 0.086 0.036 0.044 
Panel C: Sweden versus Germany 
 Sweden Germany 
  IBQS_1 CFOS_1 IBQS_1 CFOS_1 
IBQS 0.296*** 0.280** 0.241*** 0.293*** 
  (3.18) (2.05) (3.68) (2.58) 
POST 0.0012 0.0017 0.0029 0.0039 
  (0.37) (0.28) (0.99) (1.10) 
IBQS*POST -0.0466 0.0244 -0.224*** -0.309** 
  (-0.36) (0.12) (-3.26) (-2.43) 
Size 0.0160*** 0.0176* 0.0023 0.0053 
  (2.80) (1.92) (0.45) (1.13) 
Incsmooth -0.0099** -0.0128** 0.0016 -0.0021 
  (-2.42) (-2.01) (1.04) (-0.72) 
_cons 0.00428 -0.00564 0.00898*** -0.00525** 
  (1.64) (-1.35) (6.98) (-2.00) 
N 1420 805 2363 1959 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.097 0.031 0.007 0.007 
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TABLE 14 
Informativeness of Earnings Components 
Panel A: Accruals and Future Cash Flows  
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3(Profit) Model 4(Loss) 
IBQS 0.267*** 0.386*** 0.424*** 0.148* 
  (4.24) (6.42) (4.11) (1.65) 
Accruals 0.230*** 0.203*** 0.243*** 0.031 
  (5.89) (5.78) (6.06) (0.48) 
Post   0.00293 0.00234 0.00333 
    (0.80) (0.56) (0.38) 
IBQS*Post   -0.189* -0.191 -0.180 
    (-1.86) (-1.10) (-1.30) 
Accr*Post   0.052 -0.071 0.301*** 
    (0.73) (-1.17) (2.67) 
Incsmooth -0.0036** -0.0038*** -0.0037*** -0.0080 
  (-2.54) (-2.64) (-2.64) (-1.52) 
Size 0.0145*** 0.0146*** 0.0075** 0.0359*** 
  (4.75) (4.79) (2.48) (3.59) 
N 9310 9310 7746 1564 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.086 0.088 0.063 0.149 
Panel B: Accruals and Future Earnings  
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3(Profit) Model 4(Loss) 
IBQS 0.290*** 0.412*** 0.513*** 0.163*** 
 (5.73) (8.38) (6.26) (2.75) 
Accruals -0.0544 0.0116 0.0098 -0.0095 
 (-1.43) (1.31) (1.22) (-0.45) 
Post  0.0035*** 0.0031 0.0019 
  (2.66) (1.58) (0.46) 
IBQS*Post  -0.189** -0.194 -0.124 
   (-2.38) (-1.63) (-1.23) 
Accr*Post  -0.127* -0.118 -0.124 
   (-1.74) (-1.38) (-0.97) 
Incsmooth -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0045 
 (-1.27) (-1.46) (-1.56) (-1.02) 
Size 0.0076*** 0.0079*** 0.0032** 0.0228*** 
 (4.47) (4.82) (2.13) (4.10) 
N 9675 9675 8011 1664 
Adj. 𝑅𝑅2 0.123 0.138 0.233 0.111 0.120 0.109 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.1
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TABLE 15 
Annual Earnings Informativeness  
 
IBS_1 CFOS_1 
IBS 0.409*** 0.285* 0.237*** 0.301** 
  (4.00) (1.71) (3.30) (2.02) 
POST 0.110 0.0404 -0.0522 -0.628 
  (1.55) (0.38) (-0.43) (-1.63) 
IBS*POST -0.402*** -0.291* -0.318*** -0.376* 
  (-3.79) (-1.78) (-2.88) (-1.96) 
Gdp_growth 0.00404** 0.0368 -0.00194 0.0640 
  (2.54) (0.83) (-0.71) (1.23) 
Inflation 0.0499 0.168 -0.0340 0.0959 
  (1.14) (1.03) (-0.47) (0.68) 
Pop_growth -0.0839 -0.263 0.0670 -0.108 
  (-1.28) (-1.08) (0.61) (-0.49) 
Tax -0.000254 0.0305** 0.000770 0.00828 
  (-0.32) (2.13) (0.67) (0.43) 
Size -0.123 -0.146 0.150 0.0325 
  (-1.06) (-0.96) (0.70) (0.20) 
Incsmooth1 -0.0185 -0.0269 0.0769 0.0931 
  (-0.73) (-0.88) (0.89) (0.92) 
Intercept -0.0654 -0.816 0.0148 -0.122 
 
(-0.78) (-1.48) (0.14) (-0.21) 
Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES 
N 2543 2543 2507 2507 
adj. R-sq 0.001 0.014 -0.001 -0.007 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.10 
*Fixed Effects include country, industry and firm year fixed effect in this regression 
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FIGURE 1  
Merging & Acquisitions Statistics 
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FIGURE 2  
Merging & Acquisition Frequencies for two-sub periods 
Panel A: P1_no Distribution 
 
Panel B: P2_no Distribution 
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FIGURE 3 
M & A transactions distribution 
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Appendix 1 Data Definition and Source 
Variable Definition Source 
Panel A: Firm Quarter Level 
IBQ Quarterly Income before extraordinary items COMPUSTAT Quarterly 
Data Items #8.17 
CFO Measured as IBQ-Accruals COMPUSTAT. 
Accruals  Measured as ∆noncash current assets-∆current 
liabilities+∆current portion of long-term debt + 
depreciation 
COMPUSTAT Quarterly 
Data Items (item #40- item 
#36)- ∆ item #49 + ∆ item 
#45 + item#5. 
IBQS Quarterly Income before extraordinary items 
scaled by moving average of total assets  
COMPUSTAT. 
CFOS Quarterly CFO scaled by moving average of total 
assets 
COMPUSTAT. 
SUE The difference between the current quarter’s 
earnings and the earnings from the corresponding 
quarter in the previous year. 
COMPUSTAT Quarterly 
Data Items #8. 
DSUE The decile ranking of SUE scaled by the closing 
market value of equity for the previous quarter, 
transformed to a range from -0.5 to +0.5.  
EVOL The variance of earnings for the most recent eight 
quarters, deflated by average total assets 
COMPUSTAT Quarterly 
Data Items #8. 
DEVOL The decile ranking of EVOL, transformed to a 
range from -0.5 to +0.5. 
Return Use the unadjusted price (UP) at the end of each 
quarter and calculate the return as (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 -
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1)/ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1. DataStream monthly data. 
Mktreturn Value-weighted market return including 
dividends.  
Centre for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) 
monthly file.  
Abreturn Quarterly market-adjusted buy-and-hold return 
(raw return adjusted for CRSP value-weighted 
index return) 
1 
ATQ Quarterly total assets.  COMPUSTAT Quarterly 
Data Items #44. 
AT Moving average of total assets (ATQ) for the most 
recent eight quarters.  
N/A 
MVE Market Value of Equity DataStream monthly data. 
Size The decile rank of the market value at the end of 
the previous quarter, ranging from -0.5 to +0.5 
after some transformation.  
N/A 
Loss An indicator variable set to one if the current 
earnings is negative and zero otherwise.  
N/A 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 An indicator variable set to be one if there is no 
cross-year effect among the independent and 
dependent variables 
N/A 
17  We use the COMPUSTAT Quarterly Data Items definition available at http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-
p/data/obsolete/compustat.qtly.items.html.  
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Variable Definition Source 
Panel B: Firm Level  
P1_no The frequency of Merging & Acquisition 
transactions in the pre-revision period of IFRS 3R.  
Thomson. ONE  
P2_no The frequency of Merging & Acquisition 
transactions in the post-revision period of IFRS 3R. 
Thomson. ONE 
Incsmooth Measured by the correlation of a firm’s change in 
discretionary accruals with its change in pre-
managed earnings. 
COMPUSTAT. 
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Appendix 2 
 Legal System of EU member countries 
Country Legal System 
Austria civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts by the Constitutional Court 
Belgium 
civil law system based on the French Civil Code; note - Belgian law continues 
to be modified in conformance with the legislative norms mandated by the 
European Union; judicial review of legislative acts 
Cyprus* mixed legal system of English common law and civil law with Greek Orthodox religious law influence 
Czech 
Republic 
in 2014, a new civil code will replace the existing civil law system, which is 
based on former Austro-Hungarian civil codes and socialist theory and has 
been amended 40 times since the Communist regime fell in 1989 
Denmark civil law; judicial review of legislative acts 
Estonia civil law system 
Finland civil law system based on the Swedish model 
France civil law; review of administrative but not legislative acts 
Germany civil law system 
Greece civil legal system based on Roman law 
Hungary civil legal system influenced by the German model 
Ireland common law system based on the English model but substantially modified by customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in Supreme Court 
Italy civil law system; judicial review of legislation under certain conditions in Constitutional Court 
Luxembo
urg civil law system 
Netherlan
ds 
civil law system based on the French system; constitution does not permit 
judicial review of acts of the States General 
Poland 
civil law system; changes gradually being introduced as part of broader 
democratization process; limited judicial review of legislative acts, but rulings 
of the Constitutional Tribunal are final 
Portugal civil law system; Constitutional Court review of legislative acts 
Slovenia civil law system 
Spain civil law system with regional variations 
Sweden civil law system influenced by Roman-Germanic law and customary law 
United 
Kingdom 
common law system; has nonbinding judicial review of Acts of Parliament 
under the Human Rights Act of 1998 
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